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1 Introduction
There is a longstanding tradition in the economics literature to study the equivalence
between competitive equilibria and cooperative solution concepts. Such equivalence results
provide cooperative foundations for the equilibrium approach and equilibrium foundations
for the cooperative approach. A particular branch of the literature studies this question
within a matching framework.
A first paper that establishes an equivalence result in the matching set-up is Shapley
and Shubik (1971) in their study of the assignment model. Kaneko (1982) extends this
model to cover the case where utility functions are not assumed to be quasi-linear. Kelso
and Crawford (1982) study a model of job matching with salaries and find an equivalence
result for the many-to-one case. Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor, Ostrovsky, and Westkamp
(2013) obtain an equivalence result for trading networks where agents have quasi-linear
utility functions. Fleiner, Jagadeesan, Jankó, and Teytelboym (2019) further generalize the
analysis to cover general utility functions. They find an equivalence between competitive
equilibrium and a cooperative solution concept called trail-stability. The papers in this
stream of the literature rely on the existence of a commodity money that can be transferred
between agents without limits.
In important applications like school choice, money is not part of the contract. In
other applications it is, but is subject to price controls. Finally, in reality there is always a
smallest unit of account, which rules out continuous transfers. For the school choice model,
Azevedo and Leshno (2016) demonstrate the equivalence between a market clearing cutoff
and a stable outcome. For models with price rigidities, the marriage problem of Gale and
Shapley (1962) being a special case, Herings (2018) shows an equivalence between Drèze
equilibria and stable outcomes.
This paper studies a very general specification of the many-to-one matching with con-
tracts model. The set of contracts is allowed to be uncountable. Preferences can have
indifferences and need not be substitutable. For many of our results, they need not even
be continuous. An important special case is Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), where the set of
contracts is finite and preferences are assumed to be strict.
The paper introduces the notion of an expectational equilibrium. At an expectational
equilibrium, agents hold expectations about the tradability of contracts, i.e., about the
willingness of a contract’s counterparty to sign it. When agents expect that certain trades
cannot be made, then we refer to this as rationing constraints. Given such expectations, all
agents optimize and choose an optimal bundle of contracts. At equilibrium expectations
are rational in the sense that if an agents expects to be rationed in a particular contract,
then the counterparty of the contract optimally chooses not to sign it, even though that
agent does not experience rationing. In other words, at equilibrium, for each contract, at
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most one side expects rationing.1
As in the model of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), contracts may or may not involve the
delivery of money. Our notion of expectational equilibrium applies to all these cases and
does therefore not explicitly depend on prices. In a monetary economy, all contracts specify
an amount of money that the buyer of a contract has to pay to its seller. By analyzing the
contracts that are actively traded in an equilibrium, it is possible to infer the equilibrium
prices.2
As an illustration, consider the standard textbook case of partial equilibrium with
finitely many buyers and sellers, each with unit demand and unit supply, who trade a
perfectly homogeneous good. A contract consists of a buyer-seller pair and an amount of
money. Buyers and sellers form expectations about contracts that are tradable. Among
the contracts for which the buyer does not expect rationing, the one with the lowest price
is demanded, conditional on this price being below the reservation value of the buyer.
Similarly, among the contracts for which the seller does not expect rationing, the one with
the highest price is demanded, conditional on this price being above the reservation value
of the seller.
In an expectational equilibrium for the textbook case, for the effectuation of a contract
between a particular buyer and seller, both should expect this is the best price that can
be obtained. Next, it follows that all contracts that are signed in equilibrium have the
same price. Otherwise, it must be that a seller who is selling low and a buyer who is
buying high both expect rationing of the contract between them for all prices in between
the low and the high price. But that would contradict that at equilibrium at most one
side expects rationing for a given contract. The common price should be at least equal to
the reservation price of each buyer who does not trade at equilibrium and should also be
greater than or equal to the reservation price of each seller that does trade. Moreover, the
common price should be at most equal to the reservation price of each buyer who trades
at equilibrium and should also be less than or equal to the reservation price of each seller
that does not trade. The common price is therefore a market clearing price in the usual
sense of the word.
We refer to a free-contracting monetary economy if each possible trade can be accom-
1Richter and Rubinstein (2015) define the notions of unrestricted equilibrium and primitive equilibrium
for abstract economies. Their approach is based on an abstract notion of convexity and is quite different
from the one in this paper. A common feature with this paper is to think of a competitive equilibrium as
a method of creating harmony in an interactive situation with self-interested agents.
2In a very different set-up, the one of general equilibrium theory with incomplete assets markets that
allows for default and punishment, Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) show how competitive equi-
librium can be used to endogenously select the promises, default penalties, and quantity constraints of
actively traded assets.
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panied by an arbitrary amount of money. This implies that money is perfectly divisible
and that there are no legal restrictions like minimum wages that put bounds on monetary
transfers. We show that in a free-contracting monetary economy the set of expectational
equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of Walrasian equilibrium outcomes. In the
more general case of price controls, where money is perfectly divisible but monetary trans-
fers are potentially subject to lower and upper bounds, expectational equilibrium outcomes
are shown to coincide with Drèze equilibrium outcomes.
Most papers in the matching literature use cooperative solution concepts to study
matching outcomes. For many-to-one matching models, typical concepts are pairwise sta-
bility, stability, the core, and the strong core. Without putting any additional assumptions
on the primitives, we find that expectational equilibrium outcomes coincide with stable
outcomes. In particular this holds for preferences that may exhibit indifferences, discon-
tinuities, and may not be substitutable and for sets of contracts that could be countably
infinite and need not be compact or closed. Expectational equilibrium therefore singles
out the set of stable outcomes in many-to-one matching models.
Existence of expectational equilibria is guaranteed whenever stable outcomes are known
to exist. A well-known sufficient condition is substitutability as introduced in Kelso and
Crawford (1982) in terms of changes in an agent’s demand as prices change. We follow
the approach of Roth (1984) and formulate a choice-theoretic definition of substitutability.
As in Sotomayor (1999), we allow preferences to have indifferences. Our notion of substi-
tutability needs to hold for finite subsets of the set of contracts. More precisely, if a finite
set of contracts from which the agent can choose expands, then, given any optimal choice
for the original set of contracts, the agent has an optimal choice in the expanded set that
does not involve contracts that were available but not chosen before. Together with con-
tinuity of preferences, substitutability is sufficient to obtain existence of an expectational
equilibrium. Our existence proof involves an adjustment process in the style of Gale and
Shapley (1962), Crawford and Knoer (1981), Kelso and Crawford (1982), Demange, Gale
and Sotomayor (1986), and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).
The existence results also opens up avenues for equilibrium existence for monetary
economies where money is not perfectly divisible and prices are denominated in a smallest
monetary unit of account. An important application concerns the analysis of the influence
of the tick size in financial markets, see Plott, Roll, Seo, and Zhao (2019). In such models it
is still true that Walrasian equilibrium outcomes are expectational equilibrium outcomes.
However, Walrasian equilibrium outcomes may fail to exist, as is easily demonstrated in a
simple example of partial equilibrium where supply and demand curves intersect at a price
which is not a multiple of the smallest unit of account. A more general set-up is provided by
the assignment model of Shapley and Shubik (1971) in the presence of a smallest monetary
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unit of account. Since that model satisfies substitutability, expectational equilibria always
exist, whereas Walrasian equilibria may not.
Section 2 introduces the notion of expectational equilibrium in a many-to-one matching
model with contracts. It shows how that model directly incorporates the marriage problem
(Gale and Shapley, 1962), the assignment model (Shapley and Shubik, 1971), matching un-
der price controls (Herings, 2018), job matching with salaries (Kelso and Crawford, 1982),
and matching with contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005) as special cases. In Section 3
we show how in the model of school choice studied by Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda
(2015) and Azevedo and Leshno (2016), expectational equilibrium outcomes correspond
to market clearing cutoffs. Section 4 demonstrates the equivalence between expectational
equilibrium outcomes and stable outcomes and explains that under the weak assumptions
we have made, stable outcomes may not coincide with pairwise stable outcomes, core out-
comes, or strong core outcomes. Expectational equilibria are shown to exist in Section 5
when preferences are substitutable and appropriate continuity assumptions are in place.
Section 6 studies monetary economies and demonstrates that any Walrasian equilibrium is
an expectational equilibrium. The reverse implication is shown to hold for free-contracting
monetary economies. Section 7 considers the set-up of monetary economies subject to
price controls and demonstrates the equivalence to Drèze equilibrium outcomes. Section 8
contains the conclusion.
2 Expectational Equilibrium
There is a finite set of firms F, a finite set of workers W, and a set of contracts Y . The set
Y is not necessarily finite and also uncountable sets Y are permitted. The set of agents is
then I = F ∪W. Each contract y ∈ Y is bilateral, so is associated with one firm f(y) ∈ F
and one worker w(y) ∈ W. A worker w ∈ W signs at most one contract, whereas a firm can
sign any number of contracts, though not more than one contract with any given worker.
For a given set of contracts Y ⊂ Y , the set of contracts involving firm f is equal to
Y f = {y ∈ Y | f(y) = f} and the set of contracts involving worker w equals Y w = {y ∈
Y | w(y) = w}. The sets f(Y ) = {f ∈ F | ∃y ∈ Y such that f(y) = f}, w(Y ) = {w ∈ W |
∃y ∈ Y such that w(y) = w}, and i(Y ) = {i ∈ I | ∃y ∈ Y such that f(y) = i or w(y) = i}
are the sets of firms, workers, and agents involved in Y, respectively.
The consumption set Xf of a firm f ∈ F is equal to
Xf = {Y f ⊂ Y f | ∀y, y′ ∈ Y f with y 6= y′ it holds that w(y) 6= w(y′)}.
The consumption set Xf consists of sets of contracts involving firm f that associate at
most one contract with any given worker w. A firm f has to choose an element of Xf , i.e.,
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has to choose a set of workers and sign a contract with each one of them. The empty set is
an element of Xf , so the firm may choose not to sign any contract at all. The consumption
set Xw of a worker w ∈ W is given by
Xw = {Y w ⊂ Y w | |Y w| ≤ 1},
so Xw consists of the singleton subsets of Y
w
and the empty set.
The preferences of an agent i ∈ I are represented by a utility function ui : X i → R.
Without loss of generality it is assumed that ui(∅) = 0. When certain combinations of
contracts in Xf are not feasible for firm f, then it suffices to assign a negative utility level
to such a set. There are no further assumptions on the utility functions, so preferences
may exhibit indifferences and are not required to satisfy substitutability or continuity
assumptions.
A set of contracts A ⊂ Y is an outcome if for every i ∈ I it holds that Ai ∈ X i. So
in particular, every worker signs a single contract or no contract. A firm may sign many
contracts, but at most one contract with any given worker. Let A denote the set of all
outcomes. Utility functions are extended to outcomes in A by defining, for every A ∈ A,
ui(A) = ui(Ai).
The set of contracts and utility functions together define an economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I).
We illustrate now how a number of important models studied in the literature before
fit in as special cases.
Example 2.1: Gale and Shapley (1962), marriage problem.
A community consists of the same number of men and women. Each person strictly ranks
those of the oppositive sex in accordance with his or her preferences for a marriage partner.
Monetary transfers are not allowed. We define F as the set of men, W as the set of women,
and Y = F ×W as the set of contracts. A marriage contract corresponds to a pair of a
man and a woman. Utility functions are now specified in accordance with each person’s
ranking of the partners of opposite sex and the prospect of remaining single. To guarantee
that a man marries at most one woman, it is sufficient to take, for every f ∈ F, for every
Y f ⊂ Y that has at least two elements, uf (Y f ) < 0. 4
Example 2.1 does not offer the men and the women the possibility to make monetary
transfers when contracting. The polar opposite is illustrated in the next example, where
unbounded monetary transfers are allowed for.
Example 2.2: Shapley and Shubik (1971), assignment model.
In the real estate market there is a finite set of homeowners W as well as a finite set
of prospective purchasers F. Homeowner w ∈ W values his or her house at cw dollars,
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while purchaser f ∈ F values the same house at hfw dollars. There are no restrictions on
monetary transfers between homeowners and prospective purchasers. The set of contracts
is equal to Y = F ×W × R. A contract y = (f, w,m) ∈ Y involves the sale of the house
of homeowner w to buyer f against an amount of money m. The utility of a buyer f ∈ F
of a contract (f, w,m) ∈ Y is given by
uf ({(f, w,m)}) = hfw −m
and the utility of a seller w ∈ W is equal to
uw({(f, w,m)}) = m− cw.
In the model of Shapley and Shubik (1971), each buyer is interested in buying at most
one house. We therefore define, for every f ∈ F, for every Y f ⊂ Y that has at least two
elements, uf (Y f ) < 0. 4
The next example is based on Herings (2018) and covers Examples 2.1 and 2.2 as spe-
cial cases by introducing price controls. It also contains the assignment model with price
controls as studied by Talman and Yang (2008) and Andersson and Svensson (2014) as a
special case.
Example 2.3: Herings (2018), matching under price controls.
There is a finite set of buyers F and a finite set of sellers W who trade commodities in
a finite set L against money. The amount of money involved in a contract is subject to
price controls. To be more precise, the price of a commodity ` ∈ L is subject to a price
floor p
`
∈ {−∞} ∪ R and a price ceiling p` ∈ R ∪ {+∞} such that p` ≤ p`. Some agents
may not be able to trade certain commodities. This is captured by a set of feasible trades
T ⊂ F ×W × L. The resulting set of contracts is then equal to
Y = {(f, w, `,m) ∈ F ×W × L× R | (f, w, `) ∈ T and p
`
≤ m ≤ p`}.
In the model of Herings (2018), each buyer is interested in buying at most one commodity.
We therefore define, for every f ∈ F, for every Y f ⊂ Y that has at least two elements,
uf (Y f ) < 0. The concept of a commodity contains all utility relevant information. For
a buyer the utility of a commodity does not depend on the agent delivering it and for a
seller the utility of a commodity is independent of the identity of its buyer. By an appro-
priate definition of a commodity, this assumption is without loss of generality. All utility
functions are assumed to be continuous and strongly monotonic in m, decreasing in m for
buyers and increasing in m for sellers. There are limits to the monetary transfers buyers
are willing to make for commodities without price ceilings. For every f ∈ F, for every
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` ∈ L such that p` = +∞, there is m ∈ R such that uf ({(f, w, `,m)}) ≤ uf (∅). There are
limits to the monetary transfers sellers are willing to make for commodities without price
floors. For every w ∈ W, for every ` ∈ L such that p
`
= −∞, there is m ∈ R such that
uw({(f, w, `,m)}) ≤ uw(∅). Appropriate choices for the price controls reduce Examples 2.1
and 2.2 to special cases of this example. 4
Examples 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 are examples of one-to-one matching. We now present a
many-to-one matching model.
Example 2.4: Kelso and Crawford (1982), job matching with salaries.
There is a finite set of firms F and a finite set of workers W. Each firm hires as many
workers as it wishes, but each worker is allowed to work only at one firm. The set of
contracts is equal to Y = F × W × R. A contract y = (f, w,m) ∈ Y involves a labor
contract between firm f and worker w against a salary m. The utility uw({(f, w,m)}) of
worker w ∈ W is assumed to be continuous and strictly increasing in m. The gross product
of a firm f ∈ F that hires a set of workers S ⊂ W is equal to vf (S). Let Y f ∈ Xf be
a set of contracts involving the workers in S, so w(Y f ) = S, and let the salary of worker
w ∈ S as specified in the contract be equal to mw. The utility firm f derives from signing
the contracts in Y f is given by
uf (Y f ) = vf (S)−
∑
w∈S
mw.
The utility function uf is assumed to satisfy the condition of gross substitutes to be ex-
plained next. Let m,m′ ∈ RW with m ≤ m′ be vectors of workers’ salaries and let
Y f = {(f, w,m) ∈ Y | m = mw} and Y ′f = {(f, w,m) ∈ Y | m = m′w} be sets of contracts
specifying salaries m and m′ for the workers, respectively. For a set of workers S ⊂ W,
the set U(S) = {w ∈ S | mw = m′w} contains those workers whose salaries did not change
between m and m′. Let Yf contain all the solutions to
arg max
Af⊂Y f
uf (Af )
and let Y ′f contain all the solutions to
arg max
Af⊂Y ′f
uf (Af ).
The condition of gross substitutes is satisfied if for every Af ∈ Yf there exists A′f ∈ Y ′f
such that U(w(Af )) ⊂ w(A′f ). Gross substitutes requires that increases in other workers’
salaries does not cause a firm to fire a worker whose salary has not risen. 4
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Shapley and Shubik (1971) and Kelso and Crawford (1982) observe that there is an
equivalence between the notion of competitive equilibrium and the notion of stability in
their respective models, explained in Example 2.2 and 2.4, respectively. The appropriate
notion of competitive equilibrium for the model of Example 2.3 has been introduced in Her-
ings (2018). That notion also applies to the model of Gale and Shapley (1962) discussed
in Example 2.1. The next example concerns a matching model with contracts. Unlike the
previous examples, there is no known notion of competitive equilibrium that applies to this
model.
Example 2.5: Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), matching with contracts.
There is a finite set of hospitals F and a finite set of doctors W. Each hospital hires as
many doctors as it wishes, but each doctor is allowed to work only at one hospital. The
set of contracts is a finite set Y . Preferences are assumed to be strict. For every f ∈ F, for
every Y f , Y ′f ∈ Xf such that Y f 6= Y ′f it holds that uf (Y f ) 6= uf (Y ′f ). For every w ∈ W,
for every Y w, Y ′w ∈ Xw such that Y w 6= Y ′w it holds that uw(Y w) 6= uw(Y ′w). The utility
function uf is assumed to satisfy the condition of substitutes to be explained next. Let
Y ′, Y ′′ ⊂ Y with Y ′ ⊂ Y ′′ be sets of contracts. Let A′f be the unique solution to
arg max
Af⊂Y ′
uf (Af )
and let A′′f be the unique solution to
arg max
Af⊂Y ′′
uf (Af ).
Next, we define the sets of rejected contracts as Rf (Y ′) = Y ′ \A′f and Rf (Y ′′) = Y ′′ \A′′f .
The condition of substitutes is satisfied if Rf (Y ′) ⊂ Rf (Y ′′). 4
Under the assumption of substitutability on the preferences, Echenique (2012) has
shown how Example 2.5 can be embedded as a special case of Example 2.4.
We now define a notion of equilibrium that applies to the many-to-one matching with
contracts model as introduced in this section and thereby to all the examples discussed so
far, so in particular to Example 2.5 introducing the model of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).
Let Q ⊂ Y denote a set of rationing constraints as applying to firms. If a contract y
belongs to Q, then firm f(y) expects that it is not possible to trade contract y. The reason
is that firm f(y) expects that contract y does not belong to the demand set of worker
w(y). Similarly, let R ⊂ Y denote a set of rationing constraints as applying to workers.
If a contract y belongs to R, then worker w(y) expects that it is not possible to trade
contract y. The reason is that worker w(y) expects that contract y does not belong to the
demand set of firm f(y). Both Q and R are determined endogenously in an expectational
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equilibrium as defined in Definition 2.6. At equilibrium, the expectations embodied in Q
and R are rational.
Given a set of rationing constraints Q, the budget set of firm f ∈ F is given by
βf (Qf ) = {Af ∈ Xf | Af ∩Qf = ∅}.
The demand correspondence δf of firm f is defined by
δf (Qf ) = arg max
Af∈βf (Qf )
uf (Af ).
Given a set of rationing constraints R, the budget set of worker w ∈ W is given by
βw(Rw) = {Aw ∈ Xw | Aw ∩Rw = ∅}.
The demand correspondence δw of worker w is defined by
δw(Rw) = arg max
Aw∈βw(Rw)
uw(Aw).
Definition 2.6: An expectational equilibrium of the economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) is an
element (A∗, Q∗, R∗) ∈ A× 2Y × 2Y such that:
1. For every f ∈ F, A∗f ∈ δf (Q∗f ).
2. For every w ∈ W, A∗w ∈ δw(R∗w).
3. Q∗ ∩R∗ = ∅.
The first two conditions in Definition 2.6 correspond to standard optimization by firms
and workers. A firm f ∈ F only needs to know which contracts do not belong to Qf , i.e.,
the contracts for which it expects that trade is possible, and does not need to consider the
other agents in making its choices. A worker w ∈ W only needs to know which contracts
do not belong to Rw, i.e., the contracts for which the worker expects that trade is possible,
and does not need to consider the other agents when making a choice. From Conditions 1
and 2 of an expectational equilibrium, it follows that A∗ ∩Q∗ = ∅ and A∗ ∩R∗ = ∅.
Condition 3 of Definition 2.6 expresses that markets are transparent. For a given
contract, it cannot be that both sides of the market simultaneously expect to be rationed.
This condition also guarantees that expectations of firms and workers are rational. If, for
instance, y ∈ Q∗f , so the firm expects rationing for contract y, i.e., expects no demand for
contract y by worker w = w(y), then y /∈ R∗w by Condition 3 of Definition 2.6. Worker w is
therefore free to demand contract y, but chooses not to do so, since y ∈ Q∗f implies y /∈ A∗
and therefore y /∈ A∗w. The firm therefore correctly anticipates rationing for contract y.
The same kind of reasoning applies to contracts y ∈ R∗w.
9
There is no need for an explicit market clearing condition. Since any contract y ∈ A∗
involves a firm f = f(y) and a worker w = w(y), market clearing follows from A∗f ∈
δ∗f (Q∗f ) and A∗w ∈ δ∗w(R∗w).
Expectational equilibria do not rely on the presence of money as part of the contract.
This makes the concept particularly suitable for application to the marriage problem of
Gale and Shapley in Example 2.1 and the matching with contracts model of Hatfield and
Milgrom (2005). We discuss the application of expectational equilibrium to the model of
school choice studied in Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2015) and Azevedo and Leshno
(2016) in the next section and show how expectational equilibria are related to their notion
of a market clearing cutoff.
3 An Application to School Choice
Azevedo and Leshno (2016) consider a model of school choice, where the set of colleges
is finite and the set of students is either finite or a continuum. Here we present their
analysis of demand and supply for the case with a finite set of students and show how it
is related to expectational equilibrium. The set of contracts Y is identified with F ×W
and corresponds to all possible pairs of a college and a student. A student w ∈ W has
strict preferences over the colleges, which are represented by the utility function uw, where
uw({(f, w)}) > 0 corresponds to the utility provided by college f ∈ F. A college f ∈ F has
a capacity of qf seats. The preferences of college f over students are determined by the
score uf ({(f, w)}) ∈ (0, 1] college f assigns to student w. The preferences of the colleges
are assumed to be strict and responsive. We assign a utility of −1 to any set of students
with cardinality exceeding qf .
The cutoff of a college f ∈ F is the minimal score P f ∈ [0, 1] required for admission
at college f. A student w ∈ W can afford college f if P f ≤ uf ({(f, w)}), that is, college f
would accept student w. A student’s demand given a vector of cutoffs is her favorite college
among those she can afford or the empty set if no colleges are affordable. More formally,
with P = (P f )f∈F denoting the vector of cutoffs, we have
dw(P ) = arg max
{{(f,w)}∈Xw|uf ({(f,w)})≥P f}
uw({(f, w)}).
Because of the strictness of preferences, the set dw(P ) is a singleton. Aggregate demand
for college f is equal to
df (P ) = #{w ∈ W | {(f, w)} ∈ dw(P )}.
A market clearing cutoff P is a vector of cutoffs that clears supply of and demand for
colleges, i.e., for every f ∈ F, df (P ) ≤ qf and df (P ) = qf if P f > 0. Azevedo and Leshno
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(2016) show how market clearing cutoffs are related to pairwise-stable outcomes in the
model with a continuum of students and explain how to interpret the cutoffs as prices.
The analysis of school choice in terms of market clearing cutoffs has also been shown to
be very fruitful in Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2015), who use demand functions
dw to pin down the matching of a continuum of students to a finite set of schools and to
study the welfare properties of alternative ways to set priorities of the schools as a result
of lotteries and messages by students.
How are the market clearing cutoffs related to expectational equilibria? Assume that
P ∗ is a market clearing cutoff. For every w ∈ W, define R∗w as the set of colleges with a
cutoff above the score of student w, so
R∗w = {{(f, w)} ∈ Xw | P f > uf ({(f, w)})}. (3.1)
These are the colleges which are unaffordable for the student, so the student expects
rationing for these colleges. It is easily verified that dw(P ∗) = δw(R∗w). An expectational
equilibrium is obtained by defining
A∗ = {(f, w) ∈ Y | (f, w) ∈ δw(R∗w)}, (3.2)
Q∗f = {(f, w) ∈ Y \ A∗ | P ∗f ≤ uf ({(f, w)})}, f ∈ F, (3.3)
so the outcome A∗ corresponds simply to the set of college-student pairs as demanded by
the students and Q∗f is such that college f expects rationing on all students with a score
at least as high as the cutoff of college f that do not demand college f.
Proposition 3.1: If P ∗ is a market clearing cutoff, then (A∗, Q∗, R∗) as defined in
(3.1)–(3.3) is an expectational equilibrium.
Proof: To show that (A∗, Q∗, R∗) is an expectational equilibrium, we verify the three
conditions of Definition 2.6.
Consider a college f ∈ F. It holds that
βf (Q∗f ) = {Af ∈ Xf | Af ∩Qf = ∅}
= {Af ∈ Xf | ∀y ∈ Af , y ∈ A∗f or P ∗f > uf ({y})}.
If dAf (P
∗) = qf , then #A
∗f = qf , so δ
f (Q∗f ) = A∗f since A∗f consists of those qf students
in the budget set of college f with the highest scores and preferences of the college are
responsive. If dAf (P
∗) < qf , then it holds by the definition of a market clearing cutoff that
P ∗f = 0, so βf (Q∗f ) = {Af ∈ Xf | Af ⊂ A∗f} and δf (Q∗f ) = A∗f , where we use that
college f finds all students acceptable.
Clearly, by the definition of A∗, it holds that, for every w ∈ W, A∗w ∈ δw(R∗w).
Finally, we show that Q∗ ∩ R∗ = ∅. Suppose (f, w) ∈ Q∗ ∩ R∗. Since (f, w) ∈ Q∗f , we
have that P ∗f ≤ uf ({(f, w)}). Since (f, w) ∈ R∗w, it holds that P ∗f > uf ({(f, w)}), so we
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obtain a contradiction. Consequently, we have that Q∗ ∩R∗ = ∅. 2
We also have the other direction. Let (A∗, Q∗, R∗) be an expectational equilibrium.
Now, for every f ∈ F, define the cutoff P ∗f by
P ∗f = min
(f,w)∈A∗f
uf ({(f, w)}), if #A∗f = qf , (3.4)
P ∗f = 0, otherwise, (3.5)
so P ∗f is taken equal to the lowest score of a student that has been accepted by college f.
Proposition 3.2: If (A∗, Q∗, R∗) is an expectational equilibrium, then P ∗ as defined
in (3.4)–(3.5) is a market clearing cutoff.
Proof: To show that P ∗ = (P ∗f )f∈F is a market clearing cutoff, we have to argue
that, for every f ∈ F, dAf (P ∗) ≤ qf and dAf (P ∗) = qf if P ∗f > 0. We achieve this by showing
that (f, w) ∈ A∗w if and only if {(f, w)} ∈ dw(P ∗). The fact that the utility of a college
f ∈ F is equal to −1 if the cardinality of the set of students exceeds qf , whereas uf (∅) = 0,
then implies dAf (P
∗) ≤ qf . It follows from (3.4) and (3.5) that dAf (P ∗) = qf if P ∗f > 0.
Let (f, w) ∈ A∗w. It holds by (3.4) and (3.5) that uf ({(f, w)}) ≥ P ∗f .
Suppose there is f ′ ∈ F such that uf ′({(f ′, w)}) ≥ P ∗f ′ and uw({(f ′, w)}) > uw({(f, w)}).
Since A∗w ∈ δw(R∗w) it follows that (f ′, w) ∈ R∗w. By Condition 3 of Definition 2.6, it
follows that (f ′, w) /∈ Q∗f ′ . From (f ′, w) /∈ A∗f ′ , we have that uf ′({(f ′, w)}) < P ∗f ′ , leading
to a contradiction. Consequently, for every f ′ ∈ F, it holds that uf ′({(f ′, w)}) < P ∗f ′ or
uw({(f ′, w)}) ≤ uw({(f, w)}). It follows that {(f, w)} ∈ dw(P ∗).
Let w ∈ W be such that A∗w = ∅. It holds that ∅ ∈ δw(R∗w). For every f ∈ F, by
the assumption that uw({(f, w)}) > 0, it follows that (f, w) ∈ R∗w, so by Condition 3 of
Definition 2.6 (f, w) /∈ Q∗f . From A∗w = ∅, it follows that, for every f ∈ F, (f, w) is not
part of the set in δf (Q∗f ), so uf ({(f, w)}) < P ∗f . It follows that dw(P ∗) = ∅. 2
We have shown the equivalence between an expectational equilibrium and a market
clearing cutoff in a model of school choice. Our notion of expectational equilibrium is
defined for a much wider class of models, allowing for a potentially uncountable set of
contracts and completely general preferences.
4 Equivalence between Expectational Equilibria and
Stable Outcomes
In this section, we show that an outcome A∗ is part of some expectational equilibrium if
and only if it is a stable outcome. We first give the definition of a stable outcome.
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The choice correspondence Ci of agent i ∈ I is defined by
Ci(Y ) = arg max
{Ai∈Xi|Ai⊂Y i}
ui(Ai), Y ⊂ Y .
The set Ci(Y ) consists of all sets of contracts in Y i that maximize the utility of agent i.
As defined in Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor, Ostrovsky, and Westkamp (2013), an out-
come is stable if it is individually rational and there is no blocking set of contracts.
Definition 4.1: An outcome A ∈ A of the economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) is stable if:
1. For every i ∈ I, Ai ∈ Ci(A).
2. There is no non-empty B ⊂ Y \ A such that for every i ∈ I(B), for every Y i ∈
Ci(A ∪B), it holds that Bi ⊂ Y i.
Condition 1 of Definition 4.1 corresponds to individual rationality. Each worker w ∈ W
is weakly better off signing the contract in Aw than not signing it in case Aw is non-empty.
Each firm f ∈ F is weakly better off keeping all the contracts in Af than canceling some
of them.
The requirement Bi ⊂ Y i for every Y i ∈ Ci(A ∪ B) in Condition 2 implies that the
blocking set B contains a single contract for each worker w ∈ w(B). Moreover, that contract
is strictly preferred to Aw by worker w. All firms f ∈ f(B) are strictly better off by signing
all the contracts in Bf and potentially keeping some of the contracts in Af than by sticking
to the contracts in Af . A firm may have multiple optimal choices regarding the contracts
in Af it wants to keep. It is straightforward to verify that for every firm f ∈ f(B) involved
in blocking set B, Bf is a blocking set as well.
The concepts of expectational equilibrium and stable outcomes cannot be directly com-
pared. An expectational equilibrium provides more information as it also specifies rationing
constraints, i.e., expectations regarding the impossibility to trade particular contracts. We
therefore focus on the set of outcomes that can be supported by an expectational equilib-
rium and compare them to the set of stable outcomes. The set of outcomes Aee that can
be supported by an expectational equilibrium of an economy E is defined as
Aee = {A ∈ A | ∃(Q,R) ∈ 2Y ×2Y such that (A,Q,R) is an expectational equilibrium}.
The set of all stable outcomes is denoted by Aso.
The next result shows that every stable outcome is supported by an expectational
equilibrium. More precisely, given an outcome A ∈ A, define Q(A) ⊂ Y and R(A) ⊂ Y by
Q(A) = {y ∈ Y \ A | uw(y)({y}) ≤ uw(y)(A)},
R(A) = Y \ (A ∪Q(A)).
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The set Q(A) consists of those contracts which provide the worker with a utility less than
or equal to the utility of A. These are contracts for which the firms do not expect trade
with the workers. The set R(A) consists of all contracts outside A and Q(A). We show
that if A∗ is a stable outcome, then (A∗, Q(A∗), R(A∗)) is an expectational equilibrium.
Theorem 4.2: Consider an economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I). If A∗ ∈ Aso, then (A∗, Q(A∗), R(A∗))
is an expectational equilibrium, so Aso ⊂ Aee.
Proof: Let A∗ ∈ Aso. Define Q∗ = Q(A∗) and R∗ = R(A∗). We show first that, for
every f ∈ F, A∗f ∈ δf (Q∗f ).
Suppose there is f ∈ F and Af ∈ βf (Q∗f ) such that uf (Af ) > uf (A∗f ). Since Af∩Q∗f =
∅, it holds by definition of Q∗ = Q(A∗) that, for every y ∈ Af \A∗f , uw(y)({y}) > uw(y)(A∗).
Let Y ∗f ∈ Cf (Af ∪A∗) be an element in Cf (Af ∪A∗) such that Y ∗f \A∗f is minimal,
i.e., there is no Y f ∈ Cf (Af ∪A∗) such that Y f \A∗f is a proper subset of Y ∗f \A∗f . Since
Af ∩ A∗ is finite, such a minimal element exists. It holds that
uf (Y ∗f ) ≥ uf (Af ) > uf (A∗f ).
Suppose Y ∗f ⊂ A∗f . Then A∗f /∈ Cf (A∗), so Condition 1 of Definition 4.1 is violated, and
we obtain a contradiction to the stability of A∗. Consequently, Y ∗f \ A∗f is a non-empty
subset of Af \ A∗f .
We defineB = Y ∗f\A∗f and we use the minimality of Y ∗f\A∗f to conclude that for every
Y f ∈ Cf (A∗∪B) it holds that B = Bf ⊂ Y f . Since Y ∗f ⊂ Af∪A∗, it holds that Y ∗f∩Q∗f =
∅, so by the definition of Q(A∗) we have for every y ∈ B that uw(y)({y}) > uw(y)(A∗). We
conclude that for every w ∈ w(B), Cw(A∗ ∪ B) = {Bw}. Therefore B is a blocking set of
contracts, Condition 2 of Definition 4.1 is violated, and we obtain a contradiction to the
stability of A∗. Consequently, it holds for every f ∈ F that A∗f ∈ δf (Q∗f ).
We show next that, for every w ∈ W, A∗w ∈ δw(R∗w).
Suppose there is w ∈ W and Aw ∈ βw(R∗w) such that uw(Aw) > uw(A∗w). Since
Aw∩R∗w = ∅ and Aw 6= A∗w, we have Aw ⊂ Q∗w and therefore, by the definition of R(A∗),
uw(Aw) ≤ uw(A∗) = uw(A∗w), a contradiction. Consequently, it holds for every w ∈ W
that A∗w ∈ δw(R∗w).
By construction, it holds that Q∗ ∩R∗ = ∅.
We conclude that (A∗, Q∗, R∗) is an expectational equilibrium of the economy E . 2
The proof of Theorem 4.2 relies on the construction of particular rationing constraints
Q(A∗) and R(A∗), which may not be unique in supporting a particular stable outcome
A∗. Nevertheless, the next result shows the converse of Theorem 4.2. If (A∗, Q∗, R∗) is an
expectational equilibrium of the economy E , then A∗ is a stable outcome.
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Theorem 4.3: Consider an economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I). If (A∗, Q∗, R∗) ∈ A × 2Y × 2Y
is an expectational equilibrium of E , then A∗ is a stable outcome, so Aee ⊂ Aso.
Proof: Let (A∗, Q∗, R∗) ∈ A× 2Y × 2Y be an expectational equilibrium of E . Suppose
A∗ is not a stable outcome. Then there is i ∈ I such that A∗i /∈ Ci(A∗) or there is a
non-empty B ⊂ Y \ A∗ such that for every i ∈ I(B), for every Y i ∈ Ci(A∗ ∪ B), it holds
that Bi ⊂ Y i.
In the first case, take Ai ∈ Ci(A∗). If i ∈ F, then Ai ⊂ A∗i implies Ai ∈ βi(Q∗i), so
A∗i /∈ δi(Q∗i), a contradiction to Condition 1 of Definition 2.6. If i ∈ W, then Ai ⊂ A∗i
implies Ai ∈ βi(R∗), so A∗i /∈ δi(R∗i), a contradiction to Condition 2 of Definition 2.6.
In the second case, for every w ∈ w(B) it holds that uw(Bw) > uw(A∗w), so it follows
from A∗w ∈ δw(R∗w) that Bw ⊂ R∗, so by Condition 3 of Definition 2.6 it holds that
Bw ∩Q∗ = ∅. Thus we have B ∩Q∗ = ∅. Take some f ∈ f(B) and some Y f ∈ Cf (A∗ ∪B).
It holds that uf (Y f ) > uf (A∗) and, since A∗ ∩ Q∗ = ∅ and B ∩ Q∗ = ∅, it holds that
Y f ∈ βf (Q∗f ), so A∗f /∈ δf (Q∗f ), a contradiction to Condition 1 of Definition 2.6.
Consequently, A∗ is a stable outcome. 2
Combining the results of Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4: Consider an economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I). It holds that Aso = Aee.
The matching concept of stability and the equilibrium concept of expectational equi-
librium lead to exactly the same conclusions. The equivalence holds for infinite sets of
contracts and for completely general preferences. Preferences are not required to be strict
or to satisfy substitutability assumptions and may in fact exhibit discontinuities.
It is remarkable that expectional equilibrium singles out stability as the relevant con-
cept from matching theory. Other concepts that are frequently used in matching theory
are pairwise stability, the core, and the strong core. Shapley and Shubik (1971), Craw-
ford and Knoer (1981), Kelso and Crawford (1982), and Roth (1984) have shown that in
two-sided matching environments with substitutable preferences competitive equilibrium is
equivalent to pairwise stability, which under these circumstances is equivalent to stability.
However, under our general conditions, the concepts of pairwise stability, the core, and the
strong core lead to different predictions than stability. The notion of pairwise stability was
introduced in Gale and Shapley (1962). In our notation, it is defined as follows.
Definition 4.5: An outcome A ∈ A of the economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) is pairwise stable
if:
1. For every i ∈ I, Ai ∈ Ci(A).
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2. There is no singleton B ⊂ Y \A such that for every i ∈ I(B), for every Y i ∈ Ci(A∪B),
it holds that Bi ⊂ Y i.
Condition 1 of Definition 4.5 is the requirement of individual rationality. No agent will
stick to a set of contracts if it is better not to sign any of them. Condition 2 of Defini-
tion 4.5 requires that no pair of agents can sign a contract which, together with a suitable
selection of the existing contracts in A, gives both a strictly higher utility.
Example 4.6: Consider a firm f and two workers w1 and w2. Contracts are completely
standardized, resulting in the set Y = {(f, w1), (f, w2)} of possible contracts. The utility
function of the firm is specified by
uf (∅) = 0,
uf ({(f, w1)}) = 0,
uf ({(f, w2)}) = 0,
uf ({(f, w1), (f, w2)}) = 1.
The utility function of worker w1 is given by
uw1(∅) = 0,
uw1({(f, w1)}) = 1,
and of worker w2 by
uw2(∅) = 0,
uw2({(f, w2)}) = 1.
The firm strictly prefers hiring both workers to hiring a single worker or no worker and is
indifferent between all options different from hiring both workers. Each worker prefers to
sign the contract to not signing it. The only stable outcome is A = {(f, w1), (f, w2)} and
(A,Q,R) with Q = R = ∅ is an expectational equilibrium.
Consider now the outcome A′ = ∅. It is clearly individually rational and it is impossible
to find a singleton B as in Condition 2 of Definition 4.5 since the firm will not get a positive
utility when signing a contract with a single worker. We find that A′ is pairwise stable. The
outcome A′ = ∅ is not stable against general deviations B. In particular, it is not stable
against a deviation involving contracts with both workers. By Corollary 4.4 it follows that
A′ cannot be supported as an expectational equilibrium. A direct argument is as follows.
The firm will demand both contracts, unless (f, w1) ∈ Q or (f, w2) ∈ Q. Without loss of
generality, suppose (f, w1) ∈ Q. Then (f, w1) /∈ R by Condition 3 of Definition 2.6, so
worker w1 will demand the contract (f, w1), a contradiction since A
′ does not contain a
contract involving worker w1. 4
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The core is defined as follows.
Definition 4.7: An outcome A ∈ A of the economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) belongs to the
core if, for every coalition S ⊂ I, there is no outcome B ∈ A such that I(B) = S and for
every i ∈ S, ui(Bi) > ui(Ai).
An outcome belongs to the core if there is no blocking coalition S that can sign contracts
among its members S only and strictly improve the utility of every coalition member. The
next example shows that a core outcome does not need to be stable.
Example 4.8: We consider the primitives of Example 4.6, so the only stable outcome
is A = {(f, w1), (f, w2)}. The outcome A belongs to the core. The outcomes A′ = {(f, w1)}
and A′′ = {(f, w2)} are both core elements as well. Indeed, the only way to improve the
utility of the firm is by A = {(f, w1), (f, w2)}, but that leaves w1 indifferent compared to
A′ and w2 indifferent compared to A
′′. 4
We next turn to the concept of the strong core.
Definition 4.9: An outcome A ∈ A of the economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) belongs to the
strong core if, for every coalition S ⊂ I, there is no outcome B ∈ A such that I(B) = S,
for every i ∈ S, ui(Bi) ≥ ui(Ai), and, for some i ∈ S, ui(Bi) > ui(Ai).
An outcome belongs to the strong core if there is no coalition S that can sign contracts
as to make all its members weakly better off and at least one member strictly better off.
The next example shows that a stable outcome may not belong to the strong core.
Example 4.10: We consider the primitives of Example 4.6, but make the firm indif-
ferent between hiring one or two workers by setting
uf ({(f, w1), (f, w2)}) = 0.
The outcomes A = {(f, w1), (f, w2)}, A′ = {(f, w1)}, A′′ = {(f, w2)}, and A′′′ = ∅ are all
stable, since it is impossible to make the firm strictly better off. The outcomes A′, A′′, and
A′′′ do not belong to the strong core. Coalition {f, w1, w2} can block these outcomes by
outcome A, since this leaves the firm indifferent and makes at least one of the workers w1
and w2 strictly better off. 4
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5 Existence of Expectational Equilibria
In this section, we give conditions such that an expectational equilibrium exists. The main
condition is that the preferences of firms need to satisfy substitutability. In the model of
Example 2.4, substitutable preferences were introduced by Kelso and Crawford (1982) in
terms of changes in an agent’s demand as prices change. Roth (1984) introduced a related
choice-theoretic definition under which substitutability is expressed in terms of changes in
an agent’s choice as the set of available options changes. We follow the latter approach
here. For the relationships between the various notions of substitutes that have been in-
troduced in the literature, we refer the reader to Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor, Ostrovsky,
and Westkamp (2019).
Definition 5.1: The preferences of firm f ∈ F in the economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) are
substitutable if, for every finite Y, Y ′ ⊂ Y such that Y ⊂ Y ′, for every Af ∈ Cf (Y ), there
is some A′f ∈ Cf (Y ′) such that (A′f ∩ Y ) ⊂ Af .
If Af is an optimal choice for firm f within the set of contracts Y, and the set of
contracts out of which the firm can choose expands to Y ′, then the firm has an optimal
choice A′f which does not involve contracts in Y that are outside Af .
In a set-up without contracts, Sotomayor (1999) extends the definition of Roth (1984)
to the case where indifferences are allowed and requires an analogue of Definition 5.1 as
well as a related condition in case the set of available choices is reduced. For existence, it
suffices to require only one out of the two conditions.
Although our set Y is allowed to be uncountable, Definition 5.1 only involves compar-
isons between the choice behavior out of finite sets Y and Y ′. Aziz, Brill, and Harrenstein
(2013) show for the case where Y is finite that testing substitutability of weak preferences
can be performed in polynomial time.
We now define an adjustment process to find a stable outcome in case the set Y is
finite. We then use a limit argument to show the existence of a stable outcome, and by
Corollary 4.4 the existence of an expectional equilibrium, in the general case.
Definition 5.2: (Adjustment process for a finite set Y )
Step 1. Let k = 0. The set of permitted contracts Yk is equal to Y and the set of
tentatively accepted contracts Ak is equal to ∅.
Step 2. Every worker w ∈ W \w(Ak) proposes an arbitrarily chosen element of Cw(Yk).
Let Zk+1 be the union of the set of contracts as proposed by w ∈ W \ w(Ak) and the set
Ak.
Step 3. Every firm f ∈ f(Zk+1) tentatively accepts one arbitrarily chosen element
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of Cf (Zk+1). Let Ak+1 be the union of the tentatively accepted elements by the firms in
f(Zk+1).
Step 4. The process stops if Ak+1 = Zk+1. In that case the contracts in Ak+1 are
permanently accepted. Otherwise, we define Yk+1 = Yk \ (Zk+1 \Ak+1). Increase the value
of k by 1 and return to Step 2.
The adjustment process is initiated in Step 1 by setting k equal to 0, considering all
contracts in Yk as permitted, and having no tentatively accepted contracts. In Step 2 every
worker without a contract proposes one of his best contracts within the set of permitted
contracts Yk. Together with the tentatively accepted contracts Ak these contracts are col-
lected in the set Zk+1 out of which the firms tentatively choose an optimal set of contracts
in Step 3. The sets of tentatively accepted contracts are collected in the set Ak+1. If all
contracts in Zk+1 were accepted, then the process stops in Step 4 with set of permanently
accepted contracts Ak+1. Otherwise, the set Zk+1 \Ak+1 is non-empty and these contracts
are removed from Yk, resulting in the set Yk+1. The value of k is increased by 1 and the
process returns to Step 2.
Firms choose from the set of contracts Zk+1 in Step 3 of the adjustment process. The
next lemma implies that when a firm has substitutable preferences, then it cannot improve
its utility by making a choice out of the set of contracts ∪k+1j=1Zj.
Lemma 5.3: Consider an economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) where Y is finite and let (Zj, Aj)
for j = 1, . . . , k, be the sets generated in the first k iterations of the adjustment process in
Definition 5.2. Let f be a firm with substitutable preferences. Then Afk ∈ Cf (∪kj=1Zj).
Proof: Assume k = 1. If f /∈ f(Z1), then it holds that Af1 = ∅ and Cf (Z1) = {∅}. If
f ∈ f(Z1), then we have Af1 ∈ Cf (Z1).
Assume the lemma has been shown for some k ∈ N. We show it to hold for k + 1.
If f /∈ f(Zk+1), then we have Afk+1 = ∅. Since Ak ⊂ Zk+1, it holds that f /∈ f(Ak), so it
follows from the induction hypothesis that Afk = ∅ ∈ Cf (∪kj=1Zj). Since f /∈ f(Zk+1),
we have Cf (∪k+1j=1Zj) = Cf (∪kj=1Zj), so A
f
k+1 = ∅ ∈ Cf (∪
k+1
j=1Zj). Next consider the
case where f ∈ f(Zk+1). It holds by the induction hypothesis that Afk ∈ Cf (∪kj=1Zj).
By the definition of substitutable preferences, there is A′f ∈ Cf (∪k+1j=1Zk+1) such that
(A′f ∩ ∪kj=1Zj) ⊂ A
f
k . Since A
f
k ⊂ Zk+1, it follows that A′f ⊂ Zk+1, so A′f ∈ Cf (Zk+1). It
follows that Afk+1 ∈ Cf (∪
k+1
j=1Zj). 2
Theorem 5.4: Consider an economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) where Y is finite and all firms
have substitutable preferences. The adjustment process of Definition 5.2 terminates in a
finite number of steps with a set A of permanently accepted contracts. The set A is a stable
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outcome.
Proof: Suppose the adjustment process does not terminate in a finite number of steps
with a set A of permanently accepted contracts. Then, for every k ∈ N, the set Zk+1 \Ak+1
is non-empty in Step 4 and the cardinality of the set Yk+1 is at least one less than the
cardinality of the set Yk. Since the set Y0 is equal to Y , so has finitely many elements,
this leads to a contradiction. Consequently, the process terminates after a finite number
of iterations k ∈ N with a set A = Ak of permanently accepted contracts.
Since by Step 2 every worker is involved in at most one contract in A and by Step 3,
for every firm f ∈ f(A), Af ∈ Xf , it follows that A is an outcome.
Every element of A has been proposed by a worker in Step 2. It follows that, for every
w ∈ w(A), uw(A) ≥ uw(∅). For every w ∈ W \ w(A), it holds that Aw = ∅. In both cases
it holds that Aw ∈ Cw(A).
For every f ∈ f(A), it holds by Step 3 that Af ∈ Cf (A). For every f ∈ F \ f(A), it
holds that Af = ∅, so trivially Af ∈ Cf (A).
Condition 1 of Definition 4.1 is therefore satisfied by the outcome A.
Suppose there is a non-empty B ⊂ Y \ A such that for every i ∈ I(B), for every
Y i ∈ Ci(A∪B), it holds that Bi ⊂ Y i. We have that f(B) 6= ∅. Let f ∈ f(B). Then Bf is
a blocking set of contracts as well. For every w ∈ w(Bf ) it holds that uw(Bw) > uw(Aw).
For every w ∈ w(Bf ), at some iteration of the adjustment process, Bw has been re-
jected in Step 3 by firm f, so B ⊂ ∪kj=1Zj. Since by Lemma 5.3 Af ∈ Cf (∪kj=1Zj) and
A ∪ B ⊂ ∪kj=1Zj, we have Af ∈ Cf (A ∪ B). Since B ⊂ Y \ A, Af does not contain Bf ,
contradicting our supposition. Consequently, there is no blocking set B and Condition 2
of Definition 4.1 is satisfied by the set A. 2
To show existence of an expectational equilibrium in the general case, we assume that
Y is a metric space with metric d : Y ×Y → R. For every y ∈ Y , for every ε > 0, we define
the open ε ball around y by Bε(y) = {y′ ∈ Y | d(y′, y) < ε}.
The set of contracts that are acceptable for a worker w ∈ W is given by
Y
w
+ = {y ∈ Y
w | uw({y}) ≥ uw(∅)}.
The collection of sets of contracts that are acceptable for a firm f ∈ F and that consist
entirely of contracts that are acceptable for the workers is given by
Xf+ = {Y f ∈ Xf | Y f ⊂ ∪w∈WY
w
+ and u
f (Y f ) ≥ uf (∅)}.
For every f ∈ F, for every w ∈ W, the set of contracts that could be signed between f and
w as part of a set of contracts in Xf+ is given by
Y
fw
+ = {y ∈ Y
w
+ | ∃Y f ∈ X
f
+ such that y ∈ Y f}.
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For our existence result, we will assume the sets Y
fw
+ to be compact and utility functions
of firms and workers to be continuous.
Theorem 5.5: Consider an economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) where Y is a metric space, for
every f ∈ F, for every w ∈ W, Y fw+ is compact, uf and uw are continuous, and all firms
have substitutable preferences. Then the economy E has an expectational equilibrium.
Proof: As a consequence of Corollary 4.4, it is sufficient to show that E has a stable
outcome. To do so, for every f ∈ F, for every w ∈ W, we approximate the set Y fw+ by
a finite set of contracts. Let some f ∈ F, w ∈ W, and ε > 0 be given. Consider the
open cover {Bε(y) | y ∈ Y
fw
+ } of Y
fw
+ . Since every set Y
fw
+ is compact, the open cover
{Bε(y) | y ∈ Y
fw
+ } has a finite subcover {Bε(y) | y ∈ Ỹ fw}, where Ỹ fw is a finite set of
contracts in Y
fw
+ . We apply the adjustment process of Definition 5.2 to the finite set of
contracts Ỹ = ∪f∈F ∪w∈W Ỹ fw. By Theorem 5.4, the adjustment process terminates with
a stable outcome A of the economy E = (Ỹ , (ui)i∈I).
Consider a sequence (εn)n∈N of positive real numbers that converges to 0. For every
n ∈ N, let Ỹn be a finite set of contracts as defined in the previous paragraph, and let An
be the resulting stable outcome of the economy En = (Ỹn, (ui)i∈I). By listing the, potentially
empty, contracts of the workers, we can represent every An as an element of the set∏
w∈W
(∪f∈FY
fw
+ ∪ {∅}).
Since the set F is finite, we can assume without loss of generality that, for every w ∈ W,
there exists f ∈ F such that either, for every n ∈ N, ∅ 6= Awn ⊂ Y
f
or, for every n ∈ N,
Awn = ∅. Since the set
∏
w∈W (∪f∈FY
fw
+ ∪ {∅}) is compact, the sequence (An)n∈N has a
convergent subsequence, with limit, say A. The remainder of the proof verifies that A is a
stable outcome of the economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I).
It clearly holds that A is an outcome. For every worker w ∈ W, it holds by continuity
that uw(A) ≥ uw(∅). For every n ∈ N, An is a stable outcome of the economy En =
(Ỹn, (u
i)i∈I), so by Condition 1 of Definition 4.1, for every f ∈ F, Afn ∈ Cf (An), and we
have by continuity of uf that Af ∈ Cf (A). We have shown that A satisfies Condition 1 of
Definition 4.1.
Suppose there is a non-empty B ⊂ Y \ A such that for every i ∈ I(B), for every
Y i ∈ Ci(A ∪ B), it holds that Bi ⊂ Y i. We have that f(B) 6= ∅. Let f ∈ f(B) and let
Y f ∈ Cf (A ∪ B). Then Bf is a blocking set of contracts as well. For every w ∈ w(Bf ) it
holds that uw(Bw) > uw(Aw). Moreover, it holds that uf (Y f ) > uf (Af ). By continuity of
uf , every y ∈ Y f belongs to Y fw(y)+ .
For every n ∈ N, for every y ∈ Bf , let ãn(y) ∈ Ỹ fw(y)n be such that d(ãn(y), y) < εn
and define Ãn = {ãn(y) | y ∈ Bf} ∪ ∪w∈w(Y f\Bf )Awn . It holds that limn→∞ Ãfn = Y f . By
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continuity of the utility functions, we have that
limn→∞ u
f (Ãfn) = u
f (Y f ) > uf (Af ),
limn→∞ u
w(Ãwn ) = u
w(Bw) > uw(Aw), w ∈ w(Bf ).
By continuity of the utility functions, there is n′ ∈ N such that, for every n ≥ n′,
uf (Ãfn) > u
f (Afn),
uw(Ãwn ) > u
w(Awn ), w ∈ w(Bf ).
We find that, for every n ≥ n′, the non-empty set {ãn(y) | y ∈ Bf} ⊂ Ỹn \An is a blocking
set for An, a contradiction to An being a stable outcome of the economy En = (Ỹn, (ui)i∈I).
Consequently, A satisfies Condition 2 of Definition 4.1. 2
All the examples presented in Section 2 satisfy the conditions of Theorem 5.5, so an
expectational equilibrium exists in all these examples by virtue of Theorem 5.5.
Any set of sufficient conditions such that the set of stable outcomes is non-empty is a set
of sufficient conditions for the existence of an expectational equilibrium by Corollary 4.4.
For example, in a setting with strict preferences and a finite set of contracts, substitutability
has been weakened to “bilateral substitutes” in Hatfield and Kojima (2010), a condition
that reduces to standard substitutability in matching models with no terms of contract.
Another example is the “gross substitutes and complements” condition in Sun and Yang
(2006), which generalizes substitutability as defined in Kelso and Crawford (1982).3
6 Monetary Economies
We argue in this section that in economies where arbitrary transfers of money are feasible,
as is the case in the assignment model of Shapley and Shubik (1971) presented in Exam-
ple 2.2 and in the job matching with salaries model of Kelso and Crawford (1982) described
in Example 2.4, an expectational equilibrium is equivalent to a standard competitive equi-
librium.
We call an economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) a monetary economy if each contract y ∈ Y can
be written as y = (t,m), where m ∈ R is an amount of money that is transferred from the
firm to the worker and t belongs to some finite set of trades T. We have that Y ⊂ T ×R. A
trade t ∈ T covers all non-monetary aspects of the contract, so in particular the identities
of the firm and worker involved in the contract, denoted by f(t) and w(t), respectively. We
use t(y) to denote the trade involved in contract y ∈ Y and m(y) to denote the amount
3In the set-up of Kelso and Crawford (1982), it has been shown by Gul and Stacchetti (1999) that
substitutability is a necessary condition if the class of preferences includes unit demand preferences.
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of money. Given a set of contracts Y ⊂ Y , t(Y ) = {t ∈ T | ∃y ∈ Y such that t(y) = t}
denotes the set of trades related to the set of contracts Y. Without loss of generality, it is
assumed that t(Y ) = T. For t ∈ T, Yt = {m ∈ R | (t,m) ∈ Y } are the possible monetary
amounts associated to contracts in Y with trade t. Given a finite set of contracts Y ⊂ Y ,
M(Y ) =
∑
y∈Y m(y) denotes the total amount of money involved in the set of contracts Y.
Let some monetary economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) be given. The utility function of a firm
f ∈ F is strictly monotonic in money if for every Af , A′f ∈ Xf such that t(Af ) = t(A′f )
it holds that uf (Af ) < uf (A′f ) if and only if M(Af ) > M(A′f ). The utility function of a
worker w ∈ W is strictly monotonic in money if for every Aw, A′w ∈ Xw such that t(Aw) =
t(A′w) it holds that uw(Aw) < uw(A′w) if and only if M(Aw) < M(A′w). Reservation values
are said to be bounded if for every f ∈ F there is mf ∈ R such that, for every Af ∈ Xf
with M(Af ) ≥ mf , it holds that uf (Af ) ≤ uf (∅) and for every w ∈ W there is mw ∈ R
such that, for every Aw ∈ Xw with M(Aw) ≤ mw, it holds that uw(Aw) ≤ uw(∅).
The economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) is said to be a free-contracting monetary economy if there
is a finite set of trades T such that Y = T × R.
Example 6.1: Let there be a single firm f and a single worker w1. There is a labor
contract t1 under which the firm employs the worker. This contract is completely stan-
dardized as far as the non-monetary aspects are concerned. Utility functions are quasi-
linear in money, with uf ({(t1, 0)}) = 1.1 and uw1({(t1, 0)}) = −0.1. In accordance with
the assumptions made in Section 2, the utility of not signing a contract is equal to 0, so
uf (∅) = uw1(∅) = 0. In the free-contracting monetary economy it holds that
Xf = {{(t1,m)} | m ∈ R} ∪ {∅},
Xw1 = {{(t1,m)} | m ∈ R} ∪ {∅}.
Let (A∗, Q∗, R∗) be an expectational equilibrium.
Suppose A∗ = ∅. It follows that ∅ ∈ δf (Q∗f ), so (−∞, 1.1) ⊂ Q∗t1 as otherwise the
firm would demand a contract with the worker for a wage less than 1.1. It also holds that
∅ ∈ δw1(R∗w1), so (0.1,+∞) ⊂ R∗t1 as otherwise the worker would demand a contract with
the firm at a wage above 0.1. We find that (0.1, 1.1) ⊂ Q∗t1 ∩ R
∗
t1
, a contradiction to the
market transparency required in Condition 3 of Definition 2.6. Consequently, it holds that
A∗ 6= ∅.
We have that for some m∗ ∈ R, A∗ = {(t1,m∗)}. From the requirements that A∗f ∈
δf (Q∗f ) and A∗w1 ∈ δw1(R∗w1), it follows that m∗ ∈ [0.1, 1.1]. It also follows that m∗ /∈ Q∗ft1 ,
m∗ /∈ R∗w1t1 , (−∞,m∗) ⊂ Q
∗f
t1 , and (m
∗,+∞) ⊂ R∗w1t1 . By employing Condition 3 of Defini-
tion 2.6, market transparency, we find that for everym∗ ∈ [0.1, 1.1] there is an expectational
equilibrium given by A∗ = {(t1,m∗)}, Q∗ = {t1}×(−∞,m∗), and R∗ = {t1}×(m∗,+∞). 4
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In the expectational equilibrium of Example 6.1, the traded contract involves a wage
equal to m∗ ∈ [0.1, 1.1]. The worker expects that the firm is not willing to trade a contact
with a wage above m∗ and the firm expects that the worker is not willing to trade a contract
with a wage below m∗. This is exactly in accordance with the usual notion of competitive
equilibrium, where buyers expect no supply below the equilibrium price and sellers expect
no demand above the equilibrium price.
In reality, money is not perfectly divisible, but there is a denomination µ > 0 such that
all monetary amounts in contracts are integer multiples of µ, so belong to the set
M(µ) = {m ∈ R | ∃k ∈ Z such that m = kµ}.
The economy E is a discrete free-contracting monetary economy if there is a finite set T
and µ > 0 such that Y = T ×M(µ).
Example 6.2: Consider the discrete free-contracting economy resulting from µ = 1
that corresponds to Example 6.1. It follows that there is a single firm f, a single worker w1,
and a single labor contract t1, standardized as far as non-monetary aspects are concerned.
Utility functions are quasi-linear in money with uf ({(0, t1)}) = 1.1 and uw1({(0, t1)}) =
−0.1. The utility of not signing a contract is equal to 0, so uf (∅) = uw1(∅) = 0. We have
that
Xf = {{(t1,m)} | m ∈ Z} ∪ {∅},
Xw1 = {{(t1,m)} | m ∈ Z} ∪ {∅}.
Consider a set of rationing constraints Q ∈ 2Y . Let p
t1
(Q) be the infimum of the set
M(µ) \ Qt1 , the lowest wage against which firm f expects to be able to hire worker w1.
It holds that p
t1
(Q) = −∞ if M(µ) \ Qt1 6= ∅ and has no minimum, pt1(Q) ∈ Z if
M(µ) \Qt1 6= ∅ and the minimum of this set exists, and pt1(Q) = +∞ if M(µ) \Qt1 = ∅.
It holds that δf (Qf ) = ∅ if p
t1
(Q) = −∞, δf (Qf ) = {{(t1, pt1(Q))}} if pt1(Q) ∈ Z and
p
t1
(Q) ≤ 1, and δf (Qf ) = {∅} if p
t1
(Q) ≥ 2.
Similarly, consider a set of rationing constraints R ∈ 2Y . Let pt1(R) be the supremum of
the set M(µ) \ Rt1 , the highest wage worker w1 expects to receive. It holds that pt1(R) =
+∞ if M(µ) \ Rt1 6= ∅ and has no maximum, pt1(R) ∈ Z if M(µ) \ Rt1 6= ∅ and the
maximum of this set exists, and pt1(R) = −∞ if M(µ)\Rt1 = ∅. It holds that δ
w1(Rw1) = ∅
if pt1(R) = +∞, δ
w1(Rw1) = {{(t1, pt1(R))}} if pt1(R) ∈ Z and pt1(R) ≥ 1, and δ
w1(Rw1) =
{∅} if pt1(R) ≤ 0.
Let (A∗, Q∗, R∗) be an expectational equilibrium.
Suppose A∗ = ∅. It follows that ∅ ∈ δf (Q∗f ), so p
t1
(Q∗) ≥ 2, and therefore
2 ≤ inf M(µ) \Q∗t1 ≤ inf R
∗
t1
≤ 1 + supM(µ) \R∗t1 = 1 + pt1(R
∗),
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where the first inequality uses that R∗t1 ⊂ M(µ) \ Q
∗
t1
. We have derived that pt1(R
∗) ≥ 1.
Since ∅ ∈ δw1(R∗w1), it holds that pt1(R
∗) ≤ 0 and we have obtained a contradiction.
Consequently, it holds that A∗ 6= ∅ and therefore t(A∗) = {t1}.
From t(A∗) = {t1}, we derive that pt1(Q
∗) ≤ 1, so from A∗f ∈ δf (Q∗f ), we have that
M(A∗) ≤ 1. At the same time, it holds that pt1(R
∗) ≥ 1, so from A∗w1 ∈ δw1(R∗w1), we have
that M(A∗) ≥ 1. We conclude that M(A∗) = p
t1
(Q∗) = pt1(R
∗) = 1, so A∗ = {(t1, 1)}. We
show next that Q∗ and R∗ are uniquely determined as well.
Suppose there is m ∈ Q∗t1 such that m > 1. Since Q
∗ ∩ R∗ = ∅, we have that m ∈
M(µ) \ R∗t1 , so pt1(R
∗) ≥ 2, leading to a contradiction with pt1(R
∗) = 1. Consequently,
since A∗ ∩ Q∗ = ∅ and M(A∗) = 1, we have that Q∗t1 ⊂ (−∞, 0] ∩ Z. Now it follows that
Q∗t1 = (−∞, 0] ∩ Z, since otherwise the firm would demand a contract with a wage below
1.
Suppose there is m ∈ R∗t1 such that m < 1. Since Q
∗∩R∗ = ∅, we have that m ∈M(µ)\
Q∗t1 , so pt1
(Q∗) ≤ 0, a contradiction with p
t1
(Q∗) = 1. Consequently, since A∗∩R∗ = ∅ and
M(A∗) = 1, we have that R∗t1 ⊂ [2,+∞)∩Z. Now it follows that R
∗
t1
= [2,+∞)∩Z, since
otherwise the worker would demand a contract with a wage above 1.
It is easy to check that (A∗, Q∗, R∗) indeed satisfies the conditions of Definition 2.6, so
is an expectational equilibrium. 4
Example 6.2 considers a discrete free-contracting monetary economy. The primitives
are the same as in Example 6.1, except that there is a smallest unit of account equal to 1.
There is now a unique expectational equilibrium where the labor of the worker is traded
against a price of 1. The firm expects that it is not possible to hire the worker against a
lower wage and the worker expects that the firm is not willing to offer a better wage.
For a monetary economy E , we can also define the notion of a Walrasian equilibrium.
Firms and workers optimize utility while taking prices for trades p ∈
∏
t∈T Y t as given.
The budget set of a firm f ∈ F is given by
Bf (p) = {Af ∈ Xf | ∀y ∈ Af , m(y) = pt(y)}, p ∈
∏
t∈T
Y t.
The demand correspondence Df of firm f is defined by
Df (p) = arg max
Af∈Bf (p)
uf (Af ), p ∈
∏
t∈T
Y t.
Similarly, the budget set of a worker w ∈ W is given by
Bw(p) = {Aw ∈ Xw | ∀y ∈ Aw, m(y) = pt(y)}, p ∈
∏
t∈T
Y t,
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and the demand correspondence Dw of worker w by
Dw(p) = arg max
Aw∈Bw(p)
uw(Aw), p ∈
∏
t∈T
Y t.
We have followed the usual convention and write Bf , Bw, Df , and Dw as a function of the
entire price vector p. It is clearly sufficient to restrict attention to those prices that belong
to trades that the agent is part of.
Definition 6.3: A Walrasian equilibrium of the monetary economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I)
is an element (A∗, p∗) ∈ A×
∏
t∈T Y t such that, for every i ∈ I, A∗i ∈ Di(p∗).
Definition 6.3 requires optimization by firms and workers that take prices p∗ ∈
∏
t∈T Y t
as given. The usual market clearing condition in a Walrasian equilibrium is not needed,
since for every contract in A∗ it holds that both the firm and the worker are demanding it.
Example 6.4: Consider the primitives of Example 6.2. It holds that Df (p) =
{{(t1, p)}} if p ≤ 1 and Df (p) = {∅} if p ≥ 2. Also, we have that Dw(p) = {{(t1, p)}}
if p ≥ 1 and Dw(p) = {∅} if p ≤ 0. It is now immediate that (A∗, p∗) ∈ A ×M(µ) is a
Walrasian equilibrium if and only if A∗ = {(t1, 1)} and p∗ = 1. 4
For a given price vector p ∈
∏
t∈T Y t, firms implicitly expect that there is no possibility
to carry out a trade t ∈ T against a price below pt. It therefore makes sense to define the
set of rationing constraints Q(p) by
Q(p) = {y ∈ Y | m(y) < pt(y)}.
Similarly, for a given price vector p ∈
∏
t∈T Y t, workers implicitly expect that it is not
feasible to receive a wage above pt for trade t. We define the set of demand rationing
constraints R(p) by
R(p) = {y ∈ Y | m(y) > pt(y)}.
Theorem 6.5: Let (A∗, p∗) be a Walrasian equilibrium of the monetary economy E =
(Y , (ui)i∈I). Then (A
∗, Q(p∗), R(p∗)) is an expectational equilibrium of E .
Proof: We define Q∗ = Q(p∗) and R∗ = R(p∗) and show that (A∗, Q∗, R∗) satisfies
the three conditions of Definition 2.6.
Suppose there is f ∈ F such that A∗f /∈ δf (Q∗f ). Then there is Af ∈ βf (Q∗f ) such
that uf (Af ) > uf (A∗f ). Since ∅ ∈ βf (Q∗f ), it holds that uf (A∗f ) ≥ 0, so uf (Af ) > 0 and
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Af 6= ∅. Let
Ãf = {(t,m) ∈ t(Af )× R | m = p∗t}
be the contracts in Af where the monetary part of the contract has been replaced by the
Walrasian equilibrium price. Since, for every t ∈ T, p∗t ∈ Y t, it holds that Ãf ∈ Xf . It
is then immediate that Ãf ∈ Bf (p∗). Using the definition of Q∗, we have that M(Ãf ) ≤
M(Af ), so uf (Ãf ) ≥ uf (Af ) > uf (A∗f ), leading to a contradiction with A∗f ∈ Df (p∗).
Consequently, it holds that, for every f ∈ F, A∗f ∈ δf (Q∗f ).
An analogous argument can be used to show that, for every w ∈ W, A∗w ∈ δw(R∗w).
It follows immediately from the definition of Q∗ and R∗ that Q∗ ∩R∗ = ∅.
We have shown that (A∗, Q∗, R∗) is an expectational equilibrium of E . 2
The result of Theorem 6.5 applies to any monetary economy, so is not restricted to the
free-contracting monetary economy or the discrete free-contracting monetary economy.
When is an expectational equilibrium (A∗, Q∗, R∗) a Walrasian equilibrium? Then there
should be a price system such that all markets clear. For every contract y that belongs
to A∗, the natural candidate for the price is m(y). The firm is willing to demand and the
worker is willing to supply at that price. The next result shows that market clearing prices
can always be found in a free-contracting monetary economy.
Theorem 6.6: Let E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) be a free-contracting monetary economy with con-
tinuous utility functions and let (A∗, Q∗, R∗) be an expectational equilibrium of E . Then
there is p∗ ∈ RT such that (A∗, p∗) is a Walrasian equilibrium of E .
Proof: We first define prices p∗ ∈ RT . To do so, we divide T in five mutually exclusive
subsets T1, . . . , T5. The set of trades that are part of the expectational equilibrium outcome
are denoted by T1. The set of trades that are not part of an expectational equilibrium
outcome, but for which there is an amount of money for which neither the firm nor the
worker involved expects rationing is given by T2. The trades in T3, T4, and T5 are such that
for every amount of money either the firm or the worker expects rationing. Trades in T3
are such that both the worker and the firm expect rationing for some amounts of money,
for trades in T4 the firm never expects rationing, and for trades in T5 the worker never
expects rationing. More formally, we have
T1 = t(A
∗),
T2 = {t ∈ T \ t(A∗) | Q∗t ∪R∗t 6= R},
T3 = {t ∈ T | Q∗t 6= ∅, R∗t 6= ∅, and Q∗t ∪R∗t = R},
T4 = {t ∈ T | R∗t = R},
T5 = {t ∈ T | Q∗t = R}.
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For every t ∈ T1, let p∗t = m, where m is such that (t,m) ∈ A∗. For every t ∈ T2, choose an
element p∗t in R\(Q∗t ∪R∗t ). For every t ∈ T3, choose an element p∗t in cl(Q∗t )∩cl(R∗t ), where
cl denotes the closure of a set. Since R is connected, it follows that cl(Q∗t ) ∩ cl(R∗t ) 6= ∅.
For every t ∈ T4, define p∗t = mw(t).
For trades in T5 we choose the price to be sufficiently high such that a contract for that
price is never chosen by the firm involved. More precisely, for every f ∈ F, recall that T f
are the trades in T involving firm f and define
m̃f =
∑
t∈(T1∪T2∪T3∪T4)∩T f
max{0,−p∗t},
where we use the convention that the sum over the empty set is zero. For every t ∈ T5, we
define p∗t = m̃
f + max{0,mf}.
We now verify that (A∗, p∗) satisfies the three conditions of Definition 6.3.
Let some f ∈ F be given. By the definition of p∗t for t ∈ T1, it follows immediately that
A∗f ∈ Bf (p∗).
Suppose A∗f /∈ Df (p∗), so there is Af ∈ Bf (p∗) such that uf (Af ) > uf (A∗f ). If there is
t ∈ T5 such that t ∈ t(Af ), then
M(Af ) =
∑
t∈t(Af ) p
∗
t
=
∑
t∈(T1∪T2∪T3∪T4∪T5)∩t(Af ) p
∗
t
≥ −m̃f +
∑
t∈T5∩t(Af ) p
∗
t
≥ −m̃f + m̃f + max{0,mf}
≥ mf ,
so uf (Af ) ≤ uf (∅) ≤ uf (A∗f ). It follows that t(Af ) ∩ T5 = ∅. For every ε > 0, for every
t ∈ t(A∗f )∩ T3, from the fact that p∗t ∈ cl(R∗t ), there exists p̃t ∈ R∗t such that |p̃t− p∗t | ≤ ε.
From Condition 3 in Definition 2.6 of an expectational equilibrium, we have that p̃t /∈ Q∗t .
We define
Ãf = {y ∈ Af | t(y) /∈ T3} ∪ {y ∈ Af | t(y) ∈ T3 and m(y) = p̃t(y)},
so Ãf results from Af by changing the price of trades t in t(Af ) ∩ T3 from p∗t to p̃t. Since
Ãf ∩ Q∗f = ∅, it holds that Ãf ∈ βf (Q∗f ). By continuity of uf it holds that for ε > 0
sufficiently small, uf (Ãf ) > uf (A∗f ), contradicting that A∗f ∈ δf (Q∗f ). Consequently, it
holds that A∗f ∈ Df (p∗).
Let some w ∈ W be given. By the definition of p∗t for t ∈ T1, it follows immediately
that A∗w ∈ Bw(p∗).
Suppose A∗w /∈ Dw(p∗), so there is Aw = {(t, p∗t )} ∈ Bw(p∗) such that uw({(t, p∗t )}) >
uw(A∗w). Since Aw 6= A∗w, it holds that t /∈ T1. From Aw /∈ βw(R∗w), it follows that p∗t ∈ R∗t ,
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so t /∈ T2 ∪T5. If t ∈ T4, then p∗t = mw, so it holds that uw(Aw) ≤ uw(∅) ≤ uw(A∗w), so the
only possibility is that t ∈ T3.
Suppose t ∈ T3. From Aw /∈ βw(R∗w), it follows that p∗t ∈ R∗t . Since p∗t ∈ cl(Q∗t ), for
every ε > 0, there exists p̃t ∈ Q∗t such that |p̃t−p∗t | ≤ ε. From Condition 3 in the definition
of an expectational equilibrium, we have that p̃t /∈ R∗t . It follows that {(t, p̃t)} ∈ βw(R∗w)
and, by continuity of uw, for ε > 0 sufficiently small, uw({(t, p̃t)}) > uw(A∗w), leading to a
contradiction. Consequently, it holds that t /∈ T3.
We conclude that A∗w ∈ Dw(p∗).
The final condition of a Walrasian equilibrium, for every t ∈ T, p∗t ∈ Y t, follows imme-
diately from the fact that E is a free-contracting monetary economy, which implies that
Y t = R. 2
Under the conditions in Theorem 6.6, we obtain an equivalence between expectational
equilibria and Walrasian equilibria. These conditions do not require substitutability, but
only continuity of utility functions and the absence of restrictions on monetary transfers
that are allowed. These conditions are for instance satisfied in the set-up of Sun and Yang
(2004), where utility functions are quasi-linear and satisfy the gross substitutes and comple-
ments condition. Sun and Yang (2004) demonstrate the existence of Walrasian equilibria,
which are equivalent to expectational equilibria by Theorems 6.5 and 6.6.
Example 6.7: We take the primitives of Example 6.2, but now introduce a second
worker, w2. The labor contract under which firm f employs worker w2 is denoted by
t2. The firm slightly prefers w2 over w1, u
f (t2, 0) = 1.2, whereas u
w2(t2, 0) = −0.2. The
utility of w2 when not signing a contract is u
w2(∅) = 0. The firm needs only one worker,
uf ({(t1, 0), (t2, 0)}) = uf ({(t2, 0)}) = 1.2. As in Example 6.2, we study the discrete free-
contracting economy. We argue next that this economy has no Walrasian equilibrium.
Suppose (A∗, p∗) ∈ A×
∏
t∈T Y t is a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy. There are
four possibilities: Case 1. t(A∗) = ∅, Case 2. t(A∗) = {t1}, Case 3. t(A∗) = {t2}, and
Case 4. t(A∗) = {t1, t2}. We show that each of these cases leads to a contradiction.
Case 1. t(A∗) = ∅.
Optimization by workers implies that p∗t1 ≤ 0 and p
∗
t2
≤ 0. Signing a contract with
worker w1 against a wage p
∗
t1
is now preferred by the firm to not signing a contract, a
contradiction with ∅ ∈ Df (p∗).
Case 2. t(A∗) = {t1}.
Optimization by workers implies that p∗t1 ≥ 1 and p
∗
t2
≤ 0. Since
uf (A∗f ) ≤ 1.1− 1 < 1.2 ≤ uf ({(t2, p∗t2)}),
it follows that {(t1, p∗t1)} /∈ D
f (p∗), a contradiction to (A∗, p∗) being a Walrasian equilib-
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rium.
Case 3. t(A∗) = {t2}.
Optimization by workers implies that p∗t1 ≤ 0 and p
∗
t2
≥ 1. Since
uf (A∗f ) ≤ 1.2− 1 < 1.1 ≤ uf ({(t1, p∗t1)}),
it follows that {(t2, p∗t2)} /∈ D
f (p∗), a contradiction to (A∗, p∗) being a Walrasian equilib-
rium.
Case 4. t(A∗) = {t1, t2}.
Optimization by workers implies that p∗t1 ≥ 1 and p
∗
t2
≥ 1. Since
uf (A∗f ) ≤ 1.2− 2 < 0 = uf (∅),
the firm is better off by not signing any contract, leading to a contradiction.
We conclude that the economy does not have a Walrasian equilibrium. 4
The reason that the economy of Example 6.7 does not have a Walrasian equilibrium
is the existence of a smallest unit of account, µ. If prices could be any real number, then
there is a Walrasian equilibrium with prices p∗ ∈ RT where firm f signs a contract with
worker w2. In order to weakly improve upon not signing a contract, it should hold that
p∗t2 ∈ [0.2, 1.2]. To ensure the firm doesn’t hire worker w1 instead of w2, it should hold that
p∗t1 ≥ p
∗
t2
−0.1. To make it rational for worker w1 not to demand a labor contract, it should
hold that p∗t1 ≤ 0.1. Without a smallest unit of account, Walrasian equilibrium prices are
unique and equal to (p∗t1 , p
∗
t2
) = (0.1, 0.2). These prices also admit a Walrasian equilibrium
where the firm f contracts with worker w1. Walrasian equilibrium prices are unique, but
the allocation is not in this particular case.
We show that for the primitives of Example 6.7, expectational equilibrium does not
suffer from existence issues.
Example 6.8: We consider the primitives of Example 6.7 and analyze the concept of
expectational equilibrium. We argue that there is a unique expectational equilibrium,
where firm f hires worker w2 and both sign the contract (t2, 1). To be more precise, this
expectational equilibrium is obtained by setting
A∗ = {(t2, 1)},
Q∗ = ({t1} × ((−∞, 0] ∩ Z)) ∪ ({t2} × ((−∞, 0] ∩ Z)),
R∗ = ({t1} × ([1,+∞) ∩ Z)) ∪ ({t2} × ([2,+∞) ∩ Z)).
The firm has the choice between not signing a contract, hiring w1 against a wage at least
equal to 1, or hiring w2 against a wage at least equal to 1. Hiring w2 against a wage equal
30
to 1 is optimal for firm f. Worker w1 has the choice between not signing a contract or
working for firm f against a wage less than or equal to 0. The optimal choice of w1 is not
to sign a contract. Worker w2 has the choice between not signing a contract or working
for firm f against a wage less than or equal to 1. Signing a contract with firm f against
a wage equal to 1 is clearly optimal for w2. It is immediately verified that Q
∗ ∩ R∗ = ∅.
All conditions of Definition 2.6 are met, so (A∗, Q∗, R∗) is an expectational equilibrium. 4
For any denomination µ, it holds that the discrete free-contracting monetary economies
corresponding to the assignment model of Shapley and Shubik (1971) in Example 2.2 and
the job matching with salaries model of Kelso and Crawford (1982) satisfy substitutability.
Since also the other conditions in Theorem 6.5 are met, we conclude that expectational
equilibria exist in such economies, whereas Walrasian equilibria clearly may not.
7 Economies with Price Controls
For economies in which all commodities are perfectly divisible, there is an extensive lit-
erature on competitive equilibrium under price controls, starting with the contributions
by Bénassy (1975), Drèze (1975), and Younès (1975). In the presence of price controls,
Walrasian equilibria often fail to exist as it can easily be the case that every Walrasian
equilibrium violates the restrictions as imposed by the price controls. Hatfield, Plott, and
Tanaka (2012, 2016) therefore advocate to use the matching approach in the analysis.
Herings (2018) studies the model of Example 2.3 and adapts the concept by Drèze (1975)
to one-to-one matching models subject to price controls. We now extend this concept to
monetary economies as defined in Section 6.
The economy E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) is said to be a monetary economy subject to price controls
if there is a finite set of trades T, a vector of price floors p ∈ ({−∞} ∪ R)T , and a vector
of price ceilings p ∈ (R ∪ {+∞})T such that p ≤ p and
Y = {(t,m) ∈ T × R | p
t
≤ m ≤ pt}.
The free-contracting monetary economy in Section 6 results as the special case where, for
every t ∈ T, p
t
= −∞ and pt = +∞. All the examples in Section 2 are special cases as
well. As an illustration, one obtains the marriage problem of Gale and Shapley (1962)
in Example 2.1 by taking T = F ×W, for every t ∈ T, p
t
= pt = 0, and defines utility
functions such that firms never want to hire more than one worker.
We define the notion of a Drèze equilibrium for a monetary economy subject to price
controls. Firms and workers optimize utility while taking prices and rationing constraints
(p, q, r) ∈ RT × {0, 1}T × {0, 1}T as given. Consider some t ∈ T. The interpretation of
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qt = 0 is that firm f(t) experiences no rationing in trade t, whereas qt = 1 means that firm
f(t) is rationed on trade t. Similarly, rt = 0 means that worker w(t) expects no rationing
for trade t, whereas in case rt = 1 worker w(t) is rationed on trade t. The budget set of a
firm f ∈ F is given by
Bf (p, q) = {Af ∈ Xf | ∀y ∈ Af , m(y) = pt(y) and qt(y) = 0}, p ∈ RT , q ∈ {0, 1}T .
The demand correspondence Df of firm f is defined by
Df (p, q) = arg max
Af∈Bf (p,q)
uf (Af ), p ∈ RT , q ∈ {0, 1}T
Similarly, the budget set of a worker w ∈ W is given by
Bw(p, r) = {Aw ∈ Xw | ∀y ∈ Aw, m(y) = pt(y) and rt(y) = 0}, p ∈ RT , r ∈ {0, 1}T ,
and the demand correspondence Dw of worker w by
Dw(p, r) = arg max
Aw∈Bw(p,r)
uw(Aw), p ∈ RT , r ∈ {0, 1}T .
To simplify notation, we have written Bf , Bw, Df , and Dw as functions of the entire
vectors p, q, and r. It suffices to restrict attention to those components of these vectors
that correspond to the trades the agent is involved in.
The definition of Drèze equilibrium is now as follows, where the set [p, p] denotes the
set of price vectors in between the price floors p and the price ceilings p.
Definition 7.1: A Drèze equilibrium of the monetary economy subject to price con-
trols E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) is an element (A∗, p∗, q∗, r∗) ∈ A × [p, p] × {0, 1}T × {0, 1}T such
that:
1. For every f ∈ F, A∗f ∈ Df (p∗, q∗).
2. For every w ∈ W, A∗w ∈ Dw(p∗, r∗).
3. For every t ∈ T, if p∗t < pt, then q∗t = 0.
4. For every t ∈ T, if p∗t > pt, then r
∗
t = 0.
5. For every t ∈ T, q∗t = 0 or r∗t = 0.
The first two conditions in Definition 7.1 reflect standard optimization by the firms and
the workers. Firms and workers only need to know the given prices and their individual
rationing scheme and need not consider the other individuals in making their decisions.
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Condition 3 states that whenever the price of a trade t is upwards flexible, i.e., strictly
below the price ceiling pt, then there is no rationing of firm f(t). Similarly, Condition 4
states that whenever the price of a trade t is downwards flexible, i.e., strictly above the
price floor p
t
, then there is no rationing of worker w(t). Condition 5 expresses that markets
are transparent. There is no simultaneous rationing of workers and firms for a given trade
t.
In the special case where all price floors are equal to −∞ and all price ceilings are
equal to +∞, Definition 7.1 of a Drèze equilibrium reduces to Definition 6.3 of a Walrasian
equilibrium. The concept of an expectational equilibrium is richer, since it expresses expec-
tations for every possible contract, whereas a Drèze equilibrium only involves expectations
for the contract where the price of the trade is equal to the equilibrium price.
Example 7.2: Consider the primitives of Example 6.1, but assume that there is a
legal minimum wage equal to 1, which has to be respected by any contract the firm and
the worker sign. In the resulting monetary economy subject to price controls it holds that
Xf = {{(t1,m)} | m ∈ [1,+∞)} ∪ {∅},
Xw1 = {{(t1,m)} | m ∈ [1,+∞)} ∪ {∅}.
Since there is no price ceiling on the wage of the worker, by Condition 3 of Definition 7.1
it holds that q∗t1 = 0, so the firm expects no rationing. Potentially, there are two types of
Drèze equilibria. One where the worker is not rationed and one where the worker is.
Consider Drèze equilibria of the first type, so without any rationing. These are simply
the Walrasian equilibria of the economy with the worker’s wage greater than or equal
to the minimum wage, and therefore given by (A∗, p∗, q∗, r∗) such that A∗ = {(t1, p∗)},
p∗ ∈ [1, 1.1], q∗ = 0, and r∗ = 0. At a wage of 1.1 the firm is indifferent between hiring and
not hiring the worker. However, the worker takes the wage 1.1 as given and is supplying the
contract (t1, 1.1). Therefore, there is no Drèze equilibrium without rationing and without
trade.
Next we consider Drèze equilibria of the second type, so with rationing of the worker,
i.e. r∗ = r∗t1 = 1. Trivially, the optimal choice for the worker is now to stay inactive, i.e.
not sign any contract. It follows from Condition 4 of Definition 7.1 that the wage p∗ is
equal to the legal minimum wage p∗
t1
= 1. At this wage, the firm demands the contract
(t1, 1), so there is no such equilibrium.
Since all Drèze equilibria are Walrasian equilibria it holds by Theorem 6.5 that for
every Drèze equilibrium (A∗, p∗, q∗, r∗) there is an expectational equilibrium (A∗, Q∗, R∗)
with Q∗ = Q(p∗) = {y ∈ Y | m(y) < p∗t(y)} = {(t1,m) | m < p∗t1} and R
∗ = R(p∗) =
{y ∈ Y | m(y) > p∗t(y)} = {(t1,m) | m > p∗t1}. It can be verified that there are no other
expectational equilibria.
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Assume now that the legal minimum wage is raised to 2. We have that
Xf = {{(t1,m)} | m ∈ [2,+∞)} ∪ {∅},
Xw1 = {{(t1,m)} | m ∈ [2,+∞)} ∪ {∅}.
As long as the wage is above 2, then rationing of the worker is not allowed by Condition 4 of
Definition 7.1. At such a wage, the worker will demand the contract, whereas the firm will
not, and there is no equilibrium. At a wage of 2, we obtain an equilibrium with rationing
of the worker, r∗t1 = 1, and both the worker and the firm not expressing demand for the
contract. The worker because of rationing and the firm because of the wage that is too
high. The worker is unemployed and rationally expects no employment at a wage of 2.
There cannot be an expectational equilibrium involving trade, since the firm is never
going to demand a contract with a wage greater than or equal to 2. All expectational
equilibria therefore have the outcome A∗ = ∅. To make it optimal for the worker not to
demand any contract, it should be that R∗ = Y . By Condition 3 of Definition 2.6, it follows
that the firm faces no restrictions, Q∗ = ∅. Since every contract in Y involves a wage above
the productivity of the worker, the firm optimally demands no contract. There is a unique
expectational equilibrium with the same outcome as the Drèze equilibrium. 4
For given prices p ∈ [p, p], firms implicitly expect that there is no possibility to carry
out a trade t ∈ T against a price below pt. If, moreover, qt = 1, then also trade at price
pt is expected to be impossible, and by Condition 3 of Definition 7.1, pt = pt. In order to
obtain an expectational equilibrium, it therefore makes sense to define the set of rationing
constraints Q(p, q) by
Q(p, q) = {y ∈ Y | m(y) < pt(y) if qt(y) = 0 and m(y) ≤ pt(y) if qt(y) = 1}.
Analogously, for given prices p ∈ [p, p], workers implicitly expect that it is not feasible to
receive a wage above pt for trade t. If, moreover, rt = 1, then also trade at price pt is
expected to be impossible, and by Condition 4 of Definition 7.1, pt = pt. We define the set
of demand rationing constraints R(p, r) by
R(p, r) = {y ∈ Y | m(y) > pt(y) if rt(y) = 0 and m(y) ≥ pt(y) if rt(y) = 1}.
Theorem 7.3: Let (A∗, p∗, q∗, r∗) be a Drèze equilibrium of the monetary economy
subject to price controls E = (Y , (ui)i∈I). Then (A∗, Q(p∗, q∗), R(p∗, r∗)) is an expectational
equilibrium of E .
Proof: We define Q∗ = Q(p∗, q∗) and R∗ = R(p∗, q∗) and show that (A∗, Q∗, R∗)
satisfies the three conditions of Definition 2.6.
Suppose there is f ∈ F such that A∗f /∈ δf (Q∗f ). Then there is Af ∈ βf (Q∗f ) such
that uf (Af ) > uf (A∗f ). Since ∅ ∈ βf (Q∗f ), it holds that uf (A∗f ) ≥ 0, so uf (Af ) > 0 and
34
Af 6= ∅. Let
Ãf = {(t,m) ∈ t(Af )× R | m = p∗t}
be the contracts in Af where the monetary part of the contract has been replaced by the
Drèze equilibrium price. For every t ∈ t(A∗), we have q∗t = 0, since q∗t = 1 implies that
Bf (p∗, q∗) does not contain a contract involving trade t. It now follows that Ãf ∈ Bf (p∗, q∗).
Using the definition of Q∗, we have that M(Ãf ) ≤M(Af ), so uf (Ãf ) ≥ uf (Af ) > uf (A∗f ),
leading to a contradiction with A∗f ∈ Df (p∗, q∗). Consequently, it holds that, for every
f ∈ F, A∗f ∈ δf (Q∗f ).
A symmetric argument can be used to show that, for every w ∈ W, A∗w ∈ δw(R∗w).
Suppose Q∗ ∩R∗ 6= ∅. Let (t,m) ∈ Q∗ ∩R∗. By definition of Q∗ and R∗, it follows that
m = p∗t , q
∗
t = 1, and r
∗
t = 1. This leads to a contradiction with Condition 5 of Definition 7.1.
Consequently, it follows that Q∗ ∩R∗ = ∅.
We have shown that (A∗, Q∗, R∗) is an expectational equilibrium of E . 2
We show next that the converse of Theorem 8.3 holds as well. For every expectational
equilibrium of a monetary economy subject to price controls, there is a Drèze equilibrium
with the same equilibrium outcome. For this direction, we need to assume that utility
functions are continuous.
Theorem 7.4: Let E = (Y , (ui)i∈I) be a monetary economy subject to price controls
with continuous utility functions and let (A∗, Q∗, R∗) be an expectational equilibrium of
E . Then there is (p∗, q∗, r∗) ∈ RT × {0, 1}T × {0, 1}T such that (A∗, p∗, q∗, r∗) is a Drèze
equilibrium of E .
Proof: We first define prices p∗ ∈ RT . To do so, we divide T in five mutually exclusive
subsets T1, . . . , T5. The set of trades that are part of the expectational equilibrium outcome
are denoted by T1. The set of trades that are not part of an expectational equilibrium
outcome, but for which there is an amount of money that respects the price controls and
for which neither the firm nor the worker involved expects rationing is given by T2. The
trades t in T3, T4, and T5 are such that for every amount of money m ∈ [pt, pt] either the
firm or the worker expects rationing. Trades in T3 are such that both the worker and the
firm expect rationing for some amounts of money, for trades in T4 the firm never expects
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rationing, and for trades in T5 the worker never expects rationing. More formally, we have
T1 = t(A
∗),
T2 = {t ∈ T \ t(A∗) | Q∗t ∪R∗t 6= [pt, pt]},
T3 = {t ∈ T | Q∗t 6= ∅, R∗t 6= ∅, and Q∗t ∪R∗t = [pt, pt]},
T4 = {t ∈ T | R∗t = [pt, pt]},
T5 = {t ∈ T | Q∗t = [pt, pt]}.
For every t ∈ T1, let p∗t = m, where m is such that (t,m) ∈ A∗. Moreover, we define
q∗t = r
∗
t = 0. For every t ∈ T2, choose an element p∗t in [pt, pt] \ (Q
∗
t ∪R∗t ). Again, we define
q∗t = r
∗
t = 0. For every t ∈ T3, choose an element p∗t in cl(Q∗t ) ∩ cl(R∗t ). Since [pt, pt] is
connected, it follows that cl(Q∗t ) ∩ cl(R∗t ) 6= ∅. Again, we define q∗t = r∗t = 0.
For every t ∈ T4 such that pt > −∞, define p
∗
t = pt, q
∗
t = 0, and r
∗
t = 1. For every
t ∈ T4 such that pt = −∞, define p
∗
t = min{mw(t), pt} and q∗t = r∗t = 0.
For every t ∈ T5 such that pt < +∞, define p∗t = pt, q∗t = 1, and r∗t = 0. For trades
t ∈ T5 such that pt = +∞, we choose the price to be sufficiently high such that a contract
for that price is never chosen by the firm involved. More precisely, for every f ∈ F, we
define
m̃f =
∑
t∈(T1∪T2∪T3∪T4)∩T f
max{0,−p∗t}.
For every t ∈ T5 such that pt = +∞, we define p∗t = max{m̃f + max{0,mf}, pt} and
q∗t = r
∗
t = 0.
We now verify that (A∗, p∗, q∗, r∗) satisfies the five conditions of Definition 7.1.
Let some f ∈ F be given. By the definition of p∗t and q∗t for t ∈ T1, it follows immediately
that A∗f ∈ Bf (p∗, q∗).
Suppose A∗f /∈ Df (p∗, q∗), so there is Af ∈ Bf (p∗, q∗) such that uf (Af ) > uf (A∗f ). We
show first that t(Af )∩T5 = ∅. Consider some t ∈ T5. If pt < +∞, then q∗t = 1, so t /∈ t(Af ).
Consider the case where pt = +∞. If there is t ∈ T5 such that t ∈ t(Af ), then
M(Af ) =
∑
t∈t(Af ) p
∗
t
=
∑
t∈(T1∪T2∪T3∪T4∪T5)∩t(Af ) p
∗
t
≥ −m̃f +
∑
t∈T5∩t(Af ) p
∗
t
≥ −m̃f + m̃f + max{0,mf}
≥ mf ,
so uf (Af ) ≤ uf (∅) ≤ uf (A∗f ). It follows that t(Af ) ∩ T5 = ∅. For every ε > 0, for every
t ∈ t(A∗f )∩ T3, from the fact that p∗t ∈ cl(R∗t ), there exists p̃t ∈ R∗t such that |p̃t− p∗t | ≤ ε.
From Condition 3 in Definition 2.6 of an expectational equilibrium, we have that p̃t /∈ Q∗t .
We define
Ãf = {y ∈ Af | t(y) /∈ T3} ∪ {y ∈ Af | t(y) ∈ T3 and m(y) = p̃t(y)},
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so Ãf results from Af by changing the price of trades t in t(Af ) ∩ T3 from p∗t to p̃t. Since
Ãf ∩ Q∗f = ∅, it holds that Ãf ∈ βf (Q∗f ). By continuity of uf it holds that for ε > 0
sufficiently small, uf (Ãf ) > uf (A∗f ), contradicting that A∗f ∈ δf (Q∗f ). Consequently, it
holds that A∗f ∈ Df (p∗, q∗).
Let some w ∈ W be given. By the definition of p∗t and r∗t for t ∈ T1, it follows
immediately that A∗w ∈ Bw(p∗, r∗).
Suppose A∗w /∈ Dw(p∗, r∗). Then there is Aw = {(t, p∗t )} ∈ Bw(p∗, r∗) such that
uw({(t, p∗t )}) > uw(A∗w). Since Aw 6= A∗w, it holds that t /∈ T1. From Aw /∈ βw(R∗w),
it follows that p∗t ∈ R∗t , so t /∈ T2 ∪ T5. If t ∈ T4, then either pt > −∞ and r
∗
t = 1,
contradicting Aw ∈ Bw(p∗, r∗), or p
t
= −∞, so p∗t = min{mw, pt} and it holds that
uw(Aw) ≤ uw(∅) ≤ uw(A∗w), leading to a contradiction as well. The only possibility is that
t ∈ T3.
Suppose t ∈ T3. From Aw /∈ βw(R∗w), it follows that p∗t ∈ R∗t . Since p∗t ∈ cl(Q∗t ), for
every ε > 0, there exists p̃t ∈ Q∗t such that |p̃t−p∗t | ≤ ε. From Condition 3 in the definition
of an expectational equilibrium, we have that p̃t /∈ R∗t . It follows that {(t, p̃t)} ∈ βw(R∗w)
and, by continuity of uw, for ε > 0 sufficiently small, uw({(t, p̃t)}) > uw(A∗w), leading to a
contradiction. Consequently, it holds that t /∈ T3.
We conclude that A∗w ∈ Dw(p∗).
Conditions 3, 4, and 5 of Definition 7.1 follow immediately from our definition of p∗,
q∗, and r∗. 2
8 Conclusion
The connection between concepts like competitive equilibrium where agents optimize taking
the key parameters of the environment as given and concepts like stability where agents
form groups to reallocate their resources has a longstanding tradition in economics. In
matching models where agents can make monetary transfers, the equivalence of the two
approaches is well-known. In the stream of the matching literature where agents cannot
make monetary transfers or where monetary transfers are restricted like in the marriage
problem problem of Gale and Shapley (1962) or the model of matching with contracts
of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), little was known about such a connection so far. When
discussing the connection between competitive markets and stability in the context of the
marriage model, Shapley and Scarf (1974), p. 35, remark that: “It does not appear to be
possible to set up a conventional market for this model, in such a way that a competitive
price equilibrium will exist and lead to an allocation in the core.”
This paper introduces a new notion of competitive equilibrium, called expectational
equilibrium, in a very general specification of the many-to-one matching with contracts
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model. An important feature of the specification is that the set of contracts is allowed to be
uncountable. At an expectational equilibrium agents have expectations about contracts for
which trade is possible and contracts for which such is not the case. In equilibrium, agents
optimize by signing those contracts that maximize their utility given their expectations
about trading opportunities. In equilibrium, expectations are required to be rational. If
an agent expects a trading constraint for a certain contract, then the agent on the other
side expects no such constraint and is indeed not choosing the contract.
For two special cases of the model without or with limited possibilities to make mon-
etary transfers, school choice as studied by Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2015) and
Azevedo and Leshno (2016) and matching under price controls as studied in Herings (2018),
expectational equilibrium leads to the same equilibrium outcomes as the concepts studied
in these two papers, market clearing cutoff and Drèze equilibrium, respectively. For mod-
els with unlimited monetary transfers, expectational equilibrium outcomes coincide with
standard competitive equilibrium outcomes. Expectational equilibrium thereby unifies all
the existing approaches in the literature.
There are several stability concepts in matching models. For the many-to-one model,
there is pairwise stability, stability, the core, and the strong core. Moreover, in general
these concepts make different predictions. Expectational equilibrium is shown to coincide
with stability. This holds under very general conditions. In fact, this equivalence holds for
the entire class of models studied in this paper and neither requires preferences to be strict
nor assumptions like substitutability or continuity.
Existence of expectational equilibrium holds under the same conditions as those for
which the set of stable outcomes is non-empty. A well-known sufficient condition is sub-
stitutability, which is stated in this paper for any two nested sets of contracts that have
finitely many elements. Together with continuity of the utility functions, this leads to an
existence result. Interestingly, we therefore obtain an equilibrium existence result for cases
where money is not required to be perfectly divisible. Already in models of partial equi-
librium with a smallest unit of account, market clearing prices obviously may not exist.
Expectational equilibria do exist in these cases and they make exactly the prediction one
would intuitively expect. More generally, expectational equilibria exist in the assignment
model of Shapley and Shubik (1971) when prices are denominated in a smallest unit of
account, even when valuations are not.
Other classes of models where it might prove fruitful to study expectational equilibria
are those where agents face hard financial constraints. In such models, competitive equi-
libria may not exist, even when preferences are quasi-linear in money and substitutable.
To address these existence issues, Gul, Pesendorfer, and Zhang (2018) introduce random-
ized competitive equilibria and Herings and Zhou (2019) introduce quantity-constrained
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competitive equilibria. It is also promising to study expectational equilibria in matching
models with distributional constraints, see Kamada and Kojima (2015), where existence
of stable outcomes cannot be guaranteed. Nöldeke and Samuelson (2018) show that many
results in matching models with a finite number of agents, carry over to the case with a
continuum of agents. Such issues can also be examined for expectational equilibria.
It is straightforward to formulate the notion of expectational equilibrium to extensions
of many-to-one matching models like many-to-many matching models or matching models
with networks of trading agents. The extension could also cover the case where agents could
choose from uncountable sets of contracts, thereby bringing the matching models close to
standard competitive equilibrium models. Already in the many-to-many case, there are
many cooperative solution concepts, see Echenique and Oviedo (2006), Konishi and Ünver
(2006), and Klaus and Walzl (2009). How expectational equilibria relate to such notions
is an interesting direction for future research.
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